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REVIVING THE ROMAN REPUBLIC;
REMEMBERING THE GOOD OLD CAUSE
Rob Atkinson1
Caesar had his Brutus; Charles the First, his Cromwell; and George
the Third... may profit by their example.
Patrick Henry, Speech to the Virginia House of Burgesses
2
Be it declared and enacted by this present Parliament, and by the
authority of the same: That the People of England, and of all the
dominions and territories thereunto belonging, are and shall be, and
are hereby constituted, made, established and confirmed to be, a
Commonwealth or Free-State; and shall from henceforth be
governed as a Commonwealth and Free-State,-by the Supreme
Authority of this Nation the Representatives of the People in
Parliament, and by such as they shall appoint and constitute officers
1. Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell Professor of Law, Florida State
University. My thanks to Chenell Garrido, Roman Ortega-Cowan, and Michael
Rowan, my research assistants at Florida State, for their unfailing ability and
enthusiasm. I am also grateful to Adam J. Hirsch, who read and commented
extensively on a draft of this article, and Russell Pearce, who invited me to participate
in this symposium and who offered useful guidance into the literature of the
republican revival, to which he is himself a notable contributor.
In thinking and writing about republicanism, I have been particularly
fortunate in two of my friends and colleagues. Mark Seidenfeld has developed a
republican theory of administrative law. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1512 (1992).
Steve Gey has subjected the modern revival of civic republicanism to a rigorous left-
liberal critique. See Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism,
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 801 (1993). I am deeply indebted to both Mark and Steve for a
decade and a half of conversation, not only on republicanism, but also very much in
its spirit.
In thinking and writing about the seventeenth-century English
Commonwealth, I have also been most fortunate-in the idiom of the Good Old
Cause, "graciously blessed"-in my earliest academic mentor and role model, Dr.
John Richard de Witt, an authority on the theology and history of the Commonwealth
era. See, e.g., J. R. de Witt, Jus Divinum: The Westminster Assembly and the Divine
Right of Church Government (1969). What is more, he was the minister of my
childhood church, where he brought the light of the Netherlands' tolerant and learned
Calvinism to the descendants of Scottish Presbyterians. We are now both kin and
compatriots; he has married my mother's first cousin, Jane Epps, and he now
ministers to the First Presbyterian Church of Columbia, South Carolina.
2. Moses Coit Tyler, Patrick Henry 64-65 (1888).
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and ministers under them for the good of the People, and that
without any King or House of Lords.
Act of the House of Commons, May 19, 1649. 3
Our gentleman of an English king became an enemy to the English
nation; so that he ceased to be a king. Those capacities are
inconsistent. No man can be a member of the state, and an enemy
to it at the same time. Antony was never looked upon by the
Romans as a consul, nor Nero as an emperor, after the senate had
voted them both enemies. This Cicero tells us in his Fourth
Philippic: "If Antony be a consul," says he, "Brutus is an enemy; but
if Brutus be a saviour and preserver of the commonwealth, Antony
is an enemy: none but robbers count him a consul." By the same
reason, say I, who but enemies to their country look upon a tyrant as
a king?
Did you not remember, that the commonwealth of the people of
Rome flourished and became glorious when they had banished their
kings?
John Milton, A Defence of the People of England.4
Sic Semper Tyrannis.
Motto, Commonwealth of Virginia
5
INTRODUCTION
Quite appropriately, as symposium after symposium has had us
look forward into the new millennium,6 Fordham, firmly anchored in
3. Thomas Carlyle, Oliver Cromwell's Leters and Speeches with Elucidations (3d
ed. 1849) (quoting Commons Journals, May 19, 1649).
4. John Milton, A Defence of the People of England, In Answer to Salamusius's
Defence of the King, in 2 The Prose Works of John Milton 54-55, 69 (Rufus W.
Griswold ed., 1856).
5. Va. Code Ann. § 7.1-26 (1999). The great seal of the commonwealth
containing this motto was adopted by the Virginia Constitutional Convention on July
5, 1776. Virginia General Assembly, Emblems & Symbols, at
http://legis.state.va.us/CapitolClassroom/9-12/9-12Emblems.htm (last visited February
14, 2003).
6. See, e.g., Lisa Harrison, et al., National Labor Policy in the New Millennium:
The Impact of the Bush Administration, 2001 M.S.U.-D.C.L. L. Rev. 1047: William P.
Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the Millennium
Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 101 (1998);
Symposium, Fifty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit: Looking Forward
to the Next Millennium, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 1081 (1997); Symposium, Religious Liberty
at the Dawn of a New Millennium, 75 Ind. L.J. 1 (2000); Symposium, United States
Immigration Policy at the Millennium, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1889 (2000). Not
surprisingly, my hosts at Fordham have also marked the millennium with a look
forward as well as back. Mary C. Daly, et al., Contextualizing Professional
Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 Law and Contemp. Probs.
193 (1995).
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the grand Jesuit tradition of liberal learning,' has us looking back. We
need to be reminded, as the Fordham Law Review is reminding us,
that looking back is not necessarily conservative, much less backward.
It is, rather, a prerequisite of radical re-orientation; "radical" is,
literally, getting back to roots. The root of "radical," "radix," is the
ordinary Latin word for garden variety roots-radishes, for example.
This essay takes us back to the Latin roots of radicalism in law and
politics. In keeping with the theme of this year's symposium, this
article suggests that the most significant development, for both our
legal system in general and our legal ethics in particular, has been the
founding of the Roman Republic and the subsequent development,
through continual revival and revision, of the republican tradition.
And this article reminds us that a critical stage in that development,
perhaps the most vital in Anglo-American history and law, was the
seventeenth-century Commonwealth of England.
The story of the recent Republican Revival in legal scholarship is
itself now more history than news, although reports of its death may
have been exaggerated.9 Others have told that story in more detail
than this essay could accommodate' and with more expertise than this
author can claim. 1 This article focuses on several related aspects of
that Revival, those that are relevant to law in general and legal ethics
in particular. We need to look first at what was re-discovered. For
our purposes, it is important to see why legal scholars went looking to
the past in the first place, and why they liked what they saw. This
attraction to republican history is especially important in light of
criticisms of the Revival, often led, ironically enough, by historians,
7. See generally John W. O'Malley, The First Jesuits (1993).
8. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman's
"Strange Career" and the Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1025,
1025 (1998) (book review) [hereinafter Civic Republicanism] ("In the mid-1980s, it
was still breaking news in the legal academy that the Lockean tradition of classical
liberalism and individual rights was not the only conception of politics to have shaped
the ideas and actions of American political actors and lawmakers.").
9. Id. at 1038 (quoting Kalman as expressing the "intention of 'putting the final
nail in the coffin' of civic republicanism in legal theory").
10. The magisterial account, which covers the Republican Revival and much else
besides, is Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism (1996). See
Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1040 (noting that "Kalman's
descriptive flair and her near-encyclopedic coverage of the major works, as well as a
staggering number of the lesser ones, produced during this period accurately conveys
the spirit" of legal academia from the late 1970s through the early 1990s).
11. I say that without any particular humility; one of the more interesting aspects
of the Republican Revival has been the dispute, which ranges across the whole of
legal scholarship, about the qualifications of legal academics to operate outside our
field (however that field is defined). On cross-disciplinary legal studies generally, see
Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 Yale L.J.
1059 (1999). On the particular problems with legal scholars' borrowing from
historians, see Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American
Constitutionalism, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995); see also Kalman, supra note 10 at
167-90; Stoltzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1025-39.
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some of whom actually made some of the original re-discoveries.
There may be more in that history, and less, than we have realized-
less, in the way of operable guidance in the interpretation of the
Constitution, but more, and much more importantly, in the way of
materials from which to construct a fuller program of legal reform.
Critics have said that the contemporary revival of the republican
tradition has raised more questions than it answers; this article
suggests that the republican tradition answers more contemporary
questions than either its revivers or their critics have realized.
This article looks first at what the Revival was looking for, and
purported to find; second, at what its critics said, with considerable
force, that its proponents were missing; and, finally, at what else the
Republican tradition offers, beyond both what its proponents hoped
for and what its critics found wanting. Republicanism can both fulfill
its promise and answer its critics, but only by becoming more familiar
with, and more faithful to, the republican tradition. To the extent that
republicanism becomes more republican it may well lose some of its
present adherents. But it may, at the same time, gain many who never
thought of themselves as fellow-travelers. Their re-patriation will be
well worth its price.
Before we turn to those specifics, we need to examine, albeit only
briefly, our millennial perspective. That perspective, whether directed
forward or back, is doubly out of focus with respect to the republican
tradition. For one thing, it doesn't take us back nearly far enough; the
traditional year for the founding of the Roman Republic is 510 B.C.E.,
fully half a millennium before our own mathematically problematic
Year One. 2 By then, the Republic was, in all but form, already gone.
Luke's Gospel records that Jesus was born during the reign of Caesar
Augustus, in the year of the first imperial census, when Quirinius was
Roman governor of Syria. 3
These very modes of reckoning time themselves suggest the second
problem with our recent millennial fascination. What we politely
designate today as B.C.E., "before the common era," was, until quite
recently, almost universally called simply "B.C.," the abbreviation for
"Before Christ." And dates in our own era were denominated then,
as they sometimes are even now, as A.D., "Anno Domini," Latin for
"in the year of our Lord." That "lord," of course, was and is
understood to be Jesus, whom Christians regard as God incarnate,
lord of time and the universe. 14
12. See Joyce Carol Oates, The Calendar's New Clothes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30,
1999, at A27 (pointing out that "the millennium per se won't begin until the eve of
2001 ").
13. Luke 2:1-2.
14. See William Safire, B.C./A.D. or B.C.E./C.E., N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1997, § 6
(Magazine), at 22.
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Paradoxically, we in the modern and secular West reckon our
common time from a sectarian, religious date. Even in our own
American Republic, with its constitutional disestablishment of
religion, the watershed of world history is taken to be the most sacred
day of a single, albeit large and powerful, religious sect. The Roman
Republic, by contrast, reckoned its public time from a secular date
with primarily, if not purely, political significance: ab urbe condita,
from the establishment of the city, in 753 B.C.E. 15 This contrast
should put us appropriately on notice: even by our own standards, in
something as basic as the measuring of public time, our ancient
Roman Republican predecessors may have been ahead of us. 6
This is not, of course, to suggest that our republic is less laudable
than theirs. That would be absurd, even perverse. It is, rather, to
suggest that our republic, with its tradition of toleration and the rule
of law, owes more than we typically acknowledge to the much older
republic at Rome. And, as we enter our own era of world pre-
eminence, perhaps even leadership, they may still have much to teach
us; as we teeter on the brink of war, we may even learn from them
about keeping the peace.
I. THE PROMISE OF THE RECENT REPUBLICAN REVIVAL: WHAT
THE REVIVAL SOUGHT, AND CLAIMED TO FIND, IN THE
REPUBLICAN TRADITION
Fascination with the Roman Republican tradition is a perennial
phenomenon in the West; it first arose even as the Republic itself was
falling.17 It was, of course, a significant part of the epoch we know as
15. Steve Strunsky, Time for the Countdown, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1999, at 14NJ6.
This was, accordingly, the Latin title of Livy's History of Rome: Ab Urbe Condita
(Oxford Classics, Vol. I, Robert Maxwell Ogilvy ed., 1974).
16. Our sibling republic, France, tried a Roman-style republican calendar,
reckoning time from the founding of the new regime in 1792 B.C.E., Year One of the
Republic. But the new regime proved particularly unstable, not to mention bloody,
and the calendar went out with France's first republican experiment. As any political
science text will tell you, they are now working with republic number five.
17. See Livy: A History of Rome: Selections 17 (Moses Hadas & Joe P. Poe trans.,
1962) (prefacing his history of Rome's ancient and republican past, written in the
Augustan era, with the consolation that "it will distract me from the melancholy
spectacle our age has been witnessing these many years"); Moses Hadas, Introduction
to The Complete Works of Tacitus ix, xix (Alfred John Church & William Jackson
Brodribb trans., Moses Hadas ed., 1942) (describing Tacitus as "an aristocrat with a
nostalgic admiration for the Republic and contempt for a populace and a nobility
alike corrupted by slavery"). These writers, in turn, were a principal inspiration for
Americans of the Revolutionary period.
What gripped their minds, what they knew in detail, and what formed their
view of the whole of the ancient world was the political history of Rome
from the conquests in the east and the civil wars in the early first century
B.C. to the establishment of the empire on the ruins of the republic at the
end of the second century A.D., [for which knowledge they relied on]
Plutarch, Livy, and above all Cicero, Sallust, and Tacitus-writers who had
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the Renaissance. The most recent phase of that fascination, the
Republican Revival of the last decades of the last century, has looked
back particularly to that early modern revival. What we need to see in
this section is what its proponents were looking for, when they began
to look back, and why. To pose those questions is not to join their
critics in denouncing the tendentiousness of their inquiry.' It is,
rather, to lay a better foundation for answering their critics and
expanding their program in Parts II and I1.
A. Substance
Most basically, and most explicitly, contemporary scholars who
turned to the republican tradition were looking for a middle way in
modern political and legal thought between individualism and
communitarianism. As a leading republican political theorist put it,
he and his fellows have been seeking "a social philosophy that is at
once anti-collectivist and anti-atomist."' 9 In legal theory, the shoals to
steer between were, on the right, original-intent schools in
constitutional law2"' and the more general law and economics
movement, and, on the left, neo-collectivisms like the Critical Legal
Studies movement." In legal ethics, republicanism offered a means of
striking a better balance between duty to client and duty to the public,
which leftist scholars believed the dominant mode of lawyering,
neutral partisanship, had struck far too much in the direction of client
interest.22
Classical-or, more precisely, neo-classical23 - republicanism
offered just such a middle way. On the one hand, republicanism
lived either when the republic was being fundamentally challenged or when
its greatest days were already past and its moral and political virtues
decayed.
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 25 (1967).
18. See Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1033-37 (describing
charge of "presentism" raised against civic republican legal scholars); id. at 1063-64
(analyzing the circularity of the charge).
19. Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government vii
(1997); see also Kalman, supra note 10, at 159; Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism,
supra note 8, at 1033 (identifying this desideratum of the Republican Revival).
20. See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 528 ("Theorists such as Richard Epstein,
committed to at least one version of foundational rights, claim to look at the
American past but see little more than John Locke."); Kalman, supra note 10, at 8
("The discovery by liberal legal scholars of an eighteenth-century republicanism they
can attribute to the Founders responds to the exaltation by conservatives of 'original
intent."').
21. Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1039.
22. Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 Md. L.
Rev. 255, 258-66 (1990); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. Rev. 1, 11-19 (1988); Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of
the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 241 (1992).
23. As we shall see, the viability of this distinction is one of the more salient
questions critics of the Republican Revival have raised. See Gey, supra note 1, at 804
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shared with classical liberalism an emphasis on limited government.
Liberty and freedom had been watchwords of the most ancient
Republicans, and had remained central to the republican tradition.24
On the other hand, in opposition to the more libertarian strains of
liberalism and in common with most modern collectivisms,
republicanism had always offered a strong sense of the public good,
the commonweal of the commonwealth tradition. In their early
modern English incarnation, in fact, republicans were more inclined to
identify themselves as Commonwealthmen than as republicans. The
form of government mattered less to them than what government was
required, and forbidden, to do. The republican tradition thus offered
contemporary left-liberals a vision of the state essentially committed
to both individual liberty and public welfare.
Beyond that, and of particular appeal to legal scholars, was the
means by which republicanism tended to advance those dual aims: the
law. The earliest Roman Republicans had seen the expulsion of
Rome's kings as establishing not just a republican form of
government, but also, and perhaps more significantly, a government
of laws rather than men.25 What was more, these laws were distinctly
human, not divine, in origin. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, Moses
the Lawgiver delivers tablets of stone graven with the commandments
of God,26 who not only anoints kings, 7 but also appoints emperors.28
In the Roman Republican tradition, the constitution and laws are the
people's creation, 9 and even an emperor must acknowledge that his
authority derives from a popular mandate, in the form of an enacted
law. 0
("[T]he classical tradition of civic republicanism contains a number of elements that
modern proponents of civic republicanism almost uniformly disavow.").
24. See, e.g., Livy, supra note 17, at 29 (speaking of the Romans at the founding of
the monarchy as having "not experienced the sweets of liberty"); id. at 60 ("[t]he
abomination of kings.., made the people ready for liberty.").
25. See id. at 77 ("From [the time of the establishment of the Republic] my subject
will be the history of a free people-its deeds in peace and war, its magistrates now
elected annually, and the rule of laws more powerful than men.").
26. Exodus 24:12.
27. Samuel 16:1-13 (describing the anointing of King David by the prophet
Samuel at God's direction).
28. Romans 13:1 ("Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For
there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by
God.") (RSV).
29. See Milton, supra note 4, at 388 (quoting Cicero, Orat. Pro Flacco ("Those
wise and reverent ancestors of ours wished whatever the plebians decreed or the
people ordered to be so ordered or forbidden.")).
30. See id. at 389 (arguing that "even after the law of kingship, the people as a
whole was still superior to them"); Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History 59
(1999) ("In D[igest]1.14.1, Ulpian explains the emperor's power to legislate as the
result of the practice of the Roman people in formally conferring on each emperor, at
the beginning of his reign, the power to do everything that was necessary for the




The republican tradition offered its latter-day adherents a related
set of advantages that had less to do with its specific content, and
more to do with its preferred processes and its particular history. Like
its content, these more formal advantages also helped place the
Republican Revival between contemporary movements on both the
left and the right.
1. Republican Process
As we have seen, classical republicanism emphasized not only the
rule of law, but also the rule of a kind of law that was both
humanitarian in its purpose and human in its origin. This latter
insistence on the humanness of law, and of norms more generally,
suggested that republicanism might survive post-modern meta-
normative critiques of foundationalism while at the same time
retaining modernist, left-liberal values. Republican norms could
plausibly be said to rest, not on the kind of transcendant, objectively
valid foundation that post-modern thought largely rejected, but on the
more comfortably contingent and this-worldly base of popular will,
articulated through deliberative politics.3"
On the other hand, over against right-liberal, pluralist notions of
how that popular will is to be expressed, republicanism offered the
meta-value of meaningful citizen participation in self-government.
Inseparable from republicanism's dual commitment to individual
liberty and public welfare, on this view, was its insistence on active
citizen participation in government. Only in that way is individual
liberty meaningfully realized, and only in that way is the state both
limited in its interference with liberty and sustained in its direction
toward the public good. The public good, in turn, cannot be seen as
the summation of private preferences; it must be something more,
something shaped and re-shaped in meaningful and public dialogue.
2. Republican History
If the republican tradition had not offered moderately leftist
theorists this enviable combination of features, both formal and
substantive, surely they could have invented it. Indeed, their critics
have alleged that they did in fact create it to meet their current needs,
only afterward grafting it onto pre-existing stock.32 And at least some
31. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 101-31 (describing "crisis" posed to legal
theorists by anti-foundationalism); id. at 143-47 (describing appeal of civic
republicanism as a response); id. at 158-59 (noting that the legal scholars "Michelman
and Sunstein saw their own republicanism as an effort to steer between objectivism
and irrationalism"; see also Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1043-44
(summarizing Kalman).
32. See Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1045-46.
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of the chief civic republican theorists seem satisfied with the theory's
present viability, irrespective of its historical pedigree;33 they did not
care whether they had re-invented rather than re-discovered the
republican wheel, so long as it bore their contemporary load. But
many, if not most, have taken particular comfort in its history, either
in the republican tradition as a tradition, or in republicanism's
reaffirmation that ideas matter in both history and law.
a. The Power of a Proper Pedigree
At least two components of the recent Republican Revival,
constitutional law scholars and legal ethicists, have found the history
of republicanism itself to be attractive.
i. Constitutional Law Scholars
First and foremost among the historically oriented neo-republicans,
at least chronologically and numerically, were left-liberal
constitutional law scholars. Faced with the forceful revival of right-
liberal "originalism" in both the courts and the academy, they were
pressed to find alternatives to Locke and libertarianism in the
generation of the Founders. Claiming to follow historians of the
period-a claim challenged, as we shall see, by those historians
themselves-constitutional law theorists purported to find strongly
republican strands deeply woven into the Constitution itself, a public
welfare warp to the right-liberal's individual rights woof.34 Tracing
those republican, welfarist threads forward, they have tried to weave
contemporary patterns,35 patterns that their right-liberal opponents
tended to dismiss as ill-fitting patches on the constitutional fabric, if
not whole-cloth modern innovations.
ii. Legal Ethicists
Reformist scholars faced a parallel problem with conservativism in
the field of legal ethics. As we have seen, the dominant theory of
legal ethics in the late twentieth century, neutral partisanship, posed a
33. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1512.
34. Kalman, supra note 10, at 132-63; see Morton J. Horowitz, Republican Origins
of Constitutionalism, in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty Under State Constitutions 148-
49 (Paul Finkelman and Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991) ("As liberalism has
increasingly accepted an interest group pluralist picture of the world, the republican
revival has sought to rediscover a communitarian tradition that emphasized notions of
public-spiritedness and public interest and also emphasized that there was a
normative element to law, not just a neutral framework for managing traffic and
facilitating private ordering."); Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at
1043-44.
35. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988)
(discussing Bowers v. Hardwick).
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powerfully rights-based, individualist version of the lawyers' role.
More publicly-oriented alternatives abounded in the post-Watergate
era, but were subject to attack, not so much on their merits, as on their
genealogy. One of their more prominent and vocal critics, for
example, suggested that any diminution of zeal for one's client out of
consideration for the commonweal was more suitable to regimes like
Castro's Cuba and Iron-Curtain Bulgaria than to our own traditions of
limited government and individual liberty.' Looking backward,
reformist legal ethics scholars were able to show not only that neutral
partisanship was a distinctly late nineteenth-century development, but
also that explicitly republican models of lawyering lay much deeper in
the traditions of the American bar.37
b. The Advantages of (Limited) Ideological Autonomy
In addition to an appealing historical foundation, republicanism
also offers a middle way through current debates about the autonomy
of law and the role of ideas in history. On the one hand (which has
tended to be the left hand), the revival of interest in the vitality of the
republican tradition shored up concerns that ideas can function in law
or other social systems in any way independently of deeper, more
basic forces-whether, in law or elsewhere, ideas can ever function as
reasons for human actions, rather than as rationales, conscious or
unconscious. In the wake of Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, a host of
leftist cultural historians, critical legal scholars, and post-modernists of
myriad stripes all suggested that ideas are mere epiphenomena
properly reducible to more basic elements, whether social, economic,
sexual, or psychological." Recent scholarship on the historical vitality
of the republican tradition promised to stem, or at least slow, this
reductionist tide, a tide particularly problematic for scholars of law.
On the other hand (mostly the right), interdisciplinary legal scholars
have long faced a largely rear-guard attack on the whole range of
"law-ands," from the most mathematically rigorous law and
economics to the most belle-lettrist law and literature. On this view,
36. See Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1060, 1063 (1975).
37. See Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1027, 1031; supra text
accompanying note 23 (citing work of Gordon and Pearce).
38. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 172 ("Seeing the potential of ideology to revive
a social history drained dry of politics at a time when historians worried about the
survival and continuing significance of their discipline, some historians fell on
ideology as the solution to their field's problems" and were particularly drawn to
republicanism's emphasis on ideology.); Flaherty, supra note 11, at 534, 535-36
(describing marginalization of constitutional history by social history); Stolzenberg,
Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1027 ("This republican synthesis elevated ideas,
values, and belief systems from the status of epiphenomena ... to the status of major
protagonists in history.").
39. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
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which might fairly be called paleo-Langdellian, law is a self-contained,
autonomous discipline with its own distinct subject matter and
methodology. As such, it has nothing to gain, and much to lose, by
borrowing from neighboring disciplines.4" The revival of the
republican tradition by legal scholars, entailing as it necessarily did
extensive borrowings from the allied disciplines of history and
political and cultural theory, thus drove another stake into the heart
of Langdellian orthodoxy (or, more likely, merely cut another serpent
from that hydra's head).
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE REVIVAL: SINS OF OMISSION AND
COMMISSION
Critics of the republican revival, perhaps predictably, were quick to
appear.4' This section considers two kinds of critiques: that
republicanism contains normatively undesirable elements, or that,
without those elements, republicanism cannot be practically
implemented. We shall see how republicans might respond to these
critiques, both more adequately than they yet have, and more
consistently with republicanism's own traditions than its present
proponents seem to have believed possible. Sometimes this defense
will invoke history, but only in a descriptive way-to say what
republicanism has been able to do in its past, and to say what bad
elements of its past can be avoided in its future. This, however, will
leave open a serious normative gap, which can only be filled by
turning to republican history in a different, more normative way.42
A. Substance and Process
A recent defender of the republican revival has noted a peculiar
paradox in the position of its critics, which she nicely captures under
the heading "Civic Republicanism Didn't Exist, and it's a Good
Thing, Too." 43 On the one hand, critics fault the republican revival for
having so vague and protean a content as to be vacuous; on the other
hand, they fault its substantive position for being, if not entirely clear,
then clear enough to be clearly wrong, and wrong in multiple ways
(normative, descriptive, and methodological).
Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992).
40. See David Luban, Against Autarky, 34 J. Legal Educ. 176 (1984) (describing
and criticizing this view).
41. See Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1029 ("The great
popularity among law professors of the republican school of historiography gave rise
to complaints about its faddishness, a charge calculated to embarrass the proponents
of the so-called 'republican revival' in law." (citation omitted)).
42. See infra Part III.A.2.




It is often said, in general, that republicans disagree about their core
principles, and that, when they do agree, it is only on vague
generalities.44 Here we hear an echo from the founding era itself; as
John Adams observed, by "republic" one can mean "anything,
everything, or nothing. '45  More particularly, critics charge that
republicans badly blur the line between their own position and that of
liberals, especially left-liberals, 46 and obscure the historical overlap of
liberal and republican thought. 7
As to the second of these objections, Holmes's proverbial ounce of
history is relevant here: As we have seen, most civic republicans were
left-liberals. The greater surprise would be, not that their program
was not readily distinguishable from left-liberalism, but that it was.48
The remainder of this section and the next shows that the relationship
may be closer than even republicanism's critics suppose. For one
thing, republicanism may give a better account of some left-liberal
positions than left-liberalism itself; the quest for that account, as we
have seen, is what pressed many of the Revival's principle architects
in the direction of republicanism. To see whether they deliver on that
promise, we must turn to the central tenets of republicanism and to
left-liberal criticisms of each.
What of the more general charge, that republicanism is too
amorphous to count as a movement? This charge itself has several
related aspects. At one level, it may mean little more than that civic
republicanism is a "broad church," "big tent" movement; to that
extent, it is a criticism that republicans can accept with more pride
than embarrassment. 49  But is the breadth so great as to leave no
44. See generally Kalman, supra note 10, at 179; Michael P. Zuckert, Natural
Rights and the New Republicanism 151 (1994) ("The 'republican synthesis' [among
historians of the American Revolution], in a word, is not so monolithic as to deserve
the appellation 'synthesis."').
45. Zera S. Fink, The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a
Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth-Century England viii (2d ed. 1962) (quoting John
Adams); see also Kalman, supra note 10, at 174 (noting that historians "became fond
of quoting John Adams's observation that there 'is not a single more unintelligible
word in the English language than republicanism."' (citation omitted)).
46. See Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1044-45.
47. Kalman, supra note 10, at 174 ("Some historians also questioned the
relationship between liberalism and republicanism," asking "[w]as it sound, as a
matter of historical interpretation, to oppose them?").
48. See Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 601, 605-06, 606
n.23 (arguing that republicanism is not properly distinguished from liberalism, but
from "interest-group pluralism and conceptions of politics that see protection of
private rights as the sole purpose of constitutional structure").
49. See Horowitz, supra note 34, at 149-50 ("We should not unselfconsciously
propagate the view that republicanism is just one thing."); id. at 150 (arguing that
"there were many ambiguities, many complexities, many contradictions in republican
ideology in 1789" and that "[w]e should try to preserve that richness"); see also
Zuckert, supra note 44, at 151 ("The 'republican synthesis' [among historians of the
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content to criticize? On that score, we can simply let one set of critics
answer the other. Some critics, as we shall see in the next subsection,
have found more than enough shared substance to fault. °
2. Clearly Bad
To analyze the claim that republicanism is clearly bad, let us begin
with this distillation of civic republican principles, from the laboratory
of my anti-republican colleague, Steven Gey: "In one sentence, civic
republicans argue that the constitution provides the framework for an
organic community composed of socially constructed individuals, who
join together in government to identify and pursue civic virtue."'"
Professor Gey's definition can be faulted for focusing too narrowly on
the present United States Constitution; in that respect he is simply
letting civic republicans define their field. But for present purposes
his definition nicely isolates three related elements common to all
versions of revived republicanism: civic virtue, organic community,
and the social construction of the individual. With respect to each,
this section examines the critics' position and the responses that
republicans have made, or could have made.
a. Civic Virtue
Critics of republicanism, including Professor Gey, sometimes imply
that republicanism is alone in its reliance on civic virtue, which they
see as silly or scary, or both. This is due partly to the explicitness of
republicanism's reliance on civic virtue, and partly to ambiguity in the
term "civic virtue" itself. To take the definitional problem first, both
parts of the term need unpacking. The "virtue" civic republicans
invoke is not the sort of saccharine Victorian sanctimoniousness that
the term has sadly come to suggest.52 Nor need it be sexist, as its
linguist link with virility might imply. The scope of virtue, in the
classical sense, is limited to neither machismo nor human sexual
mores. As its Greek equivalent arete better suggests to modern ears,
virtue in the republican tradition has to do with the specific excellence
of a thing at its most essential task or function. Thus Socrates spoke
American Revolution], in a word, is not so monolithic as to deserve the appellation
'synthesis,"' although "It]he discovery of republicanism is of undeniable importance,
for it can help us understand the new republicanism of the American order .... ").
50. Part Il1, where this article considers the relationship of republicanism to
history, takes up a final aspect of this criticism, the charge that modern republicanism
cannot claim proper descent from classical or Renaissance republicanism.
51. Gey, supra note 1, at 806.
52. For an account of the demise and revival of virtue ethics, see Alasdair
MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981). For a more recent survey of virtue ethics, see Virtue,
Nomos XXXIV (John W. Chapman and William A. Galston ed., 1992).
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of sharpness as the virtue of knives, and swiftness as the virtue of
horses.53
For the Romans, as for the Greeks, identification of the specific
excellence, or virtue, of human beings was both more complex, and
more critical. Whatever else it involved, it had a necessarily social,
even political, component, because they viewed humans as essentially
social and political beings. Thus all political communities, not just
republics, require political, or civic, virtue:" Minimally, civic virtue
must be those qualities of character in the citizen that make the
community possible; optimally, those qualities that make the
community flourish. The kind of civic virtue republics require is more
properly seen as republican virtue. For present purposes, it can be
narrowed down quite nicely to this: minimally, citizens' willingness to
accept and defend a polity based on republican principles; optimally,
meaningful citizen participation in the public specification and
elaboration of human excellence itself.
Minimal civic virtue would require that citizens at least be willing
and able to inform themselves about matters of public importance.
They need not be informed enough to debate these issues directly, but
only enough to choose representatives who can. And, less happily,
minimal civic virtue also requires that citizens be willing to defend the
republic against overthrow or conquest. It is important to note,
however, that the citizen's role in civil defense, like the citizen's role
in political deliberation, need not be direct. Republican armies must
be under civilian control, but they need not include all citizens-or,
indeed, any citizens.
It is sometimes objected that the civic virtue of republicanism
somehow implies militarism." To be sure, some republics, ancient
and modern, have seen citizen armies as schools of civic virtue,
particularly patriotism and common purpose. But there are
doubtlessly other schools, and other means of schooling, where the
values of fraternity and equality are conveyed with less of a loss in
liberty. Republicans, indeed, steeped as they tend to have been in the
history of ancient Rome, have traditionally had a deep-seated
distaste for standing armies, particularly mercenary armies.
53. See Plato, The Republic 32-33 (Allan Bloom trans., 1968) ("'All right,' I
[Socrates] said, 'does there seem to you also to be a virtue for each thing to which
some work is assigned?'); see also Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics 41 (Martin
Ostwald trans., 1962) ("It must, then, be remarked that every virtue or excellence (1)
renders good the thing itself of which it is the excellence, and (2) causes it to perform
its function well.").
54. Miriam Galston, Taking Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal
Theory and the Moral Foundation of Deliberative Democracy, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 329, 390
(1994) (citing Aristotle's Politics for this point).
55. See Gey, supra note 1, at 804 n.5: Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra
note 8, at 1045 (noting charge that classical republicanism "is necessarily enmeshed
with the values and institutions of patriarchy, militarism, and various other forms of
domination and exclusion").
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A republic, then, need not pattern itself on the universal military
service of contemporary Switzerland or Israel, the one mostly for
acculturation, the other mostly for survival. Much less need it follow
the pattern of ancient Sparta or modern Prussia. The republic can
(and, in accord with republican preference for deliberation, should)
see war as a necessary evil forced upon its citizens by their enemies,
not as a glorious enterprise expressive of its own dearest values. Its
motto as to things military should be that of Oliver Cromwell: War for
peace. And this motto need not be given an Orwellian reading. It
need only mean that a republic must have a military to defend itself
against external enemies. 6
As republican civic virtue does not imply militarism, neither does it
imply intolerance, political, social, or cultural. 7 Contrary to what
allusions to the French Jacobins' Republic of Virtue are designed to
suggest," republicanism does not require that those lacking in civic
virtue will be persecuted, much less extirpated or exterminated.59 The
republic, to be sure, must enable virtue, and may in fact affirmatively
instill it, but need not demand or require it to the same extent in all
citizens, or to the optimal extent in any citizen. Those less committed
to republican values may meditate or fast or pray in the privacy of
56. Though the republic could-I would say should-also have a military
adequate to extend its benefits to future citizens in foreign lands as yet unfree.
57. Cf. Horowitz, supra note 34, at 152 (asserting that "[w]e are going to have to
face squarely and directly the very limited version of pluralism that was contained
within the republican tradition" and that "the liberal individualistic tradition produces
the ideology for tolerating difference").
58. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to
Liberty, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 225, 230 (1992).
We have now, as we have had since the time of the Jacobins, a determined
band of intellectuals, politicians, and publicists enraged that human material
is recalcitrant to their projects to level the condition of all men in the equal
service of their particular visions of community .... The partisans of equal
subordination to the claims of politics have always been driven to crush what
stood in their way: religion, talent, property, science, and most of all, liberty.
Id.; see also Rob Atkinson, Lawyering in Law's Republic, 85 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1524
(1999) (book review) ("Civic republicans of all stripes need reminding that the danger
of facilely enforced consensus is not peculiar to The Republic: When those with long
historical memories think of the Republic of Virtue, they have in mind not Plato, but
Robespierre."); Horowitz, supra note 34, at 151 ("The most ominous strand in the
republican tradition is contained in the widely held view that the only way to have a
free society is to have a relatively homogenous social base.").
59. See Miriam Galston, supra note 54, at 379, 382 (noting that "[c]lassical
republican thought includes a theory of civic virtue that ranges from unappealing to
terrifying to many contemporary legal theorists," but raising "the possibility that the
civic virtue presupposed by a deliberative democracy differs from the civic virtue
presupposed by classical republican theory in ways that would make contemporary
civic virtue less objectionable than classical civic virtue"); William A. Galston, The
Use and Abuse of the Classics in American Constitutionalism, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
47, 64-65 (1990) (same); cf. Gey, supra note 1, at 808 ("[Tlhe civic republican view of
government seems to mandate that the government must discourage and even punish
civic vice.").
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their study, ashram, or asylum; they may amass their wealth through
factory, field, or finance, all unmolested by the republic. The republic
will not call their ways equally virtuous, but it need not require them
to change their ways, nor need it require much from them to sustain
its own.
All the republic must have is a minimum of civic virtue, in two
reciprocal senses. Its citizens themselves must embody and practice
its virtues enough, and it must have enough such citizens, to ensure
that its internal order of citizen self-government functions, that it can
defend itself against foreign foes, and that its values are passed on to
the next generation. That minimum core of minimally virtuous
citizens is the civic republican's second essential element, an organic
community.
b. Organic Community
Civic virtue, as we have seen, implies a community in which the
citizen is virtuous, a community in terms of which civic virtue is
defined and toward which civic virtue is directed. The republican
community must be organic, at least in the sense that all citizens can
participate meaningfully in the articulation of public values, including
civic virtue itself. From this republican commitment to meaningful
dialogue among citizens about the content of civic virtue, its critics
infer several problems.
For one thing, these critics tend to insist, as did critics of the
Founders, that genuine republics must be small, face-to-face
communities ideally as small as the ancient Athenian polis or the
stereotypical New England town, but in any case not of
transcontinental scope. And civic republicans' vaguer and more
rhapsodic accounts of citizen participation do seem to imply casual
conversations among neighbors up on the Acropolis, down at the
general store, or perhaps over coffee at Starbucks. However desirable
this hominess may strike even republicanism's critics," it is hardly
necessary for a modern republic.
The Founders may well have wondered whether a republic could
span as great a space as America's eastern seaboard, given limits of
eighteenth-century transportation and communication. But we need
not worry now, in the age of jet transport, communication satellites,
and the worldwide web. Nor should we forget what Milton said about
Rome: it reached the heights of its glory, not as an empire, but as a
republic. And it was republican Rome, not democratic Athens, that
the Founders took as their principal model."
60. See Gey, supra note i1, at 815 (faulting civic republicanism for "failing to
recapture the old system's one real advantage-its homey, personal, face-to-face
means of identifying and achieving common goals").
61. See Richard M. Gummere, The Classical Ancestry of the United States
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Other critics worry that the republic's insistence on meaningful
participation implies, not that the republic must be geographically
small, but that it must be demographically exclusionary. Earlier
republics notoriously limited the franchise and other benefits of full
citizenship on the basis of property ownership, educational level, or
overtly invidious factors like sex, race, or religion. Perhaps, at some
level of social and economic development, it was simply impossible for
all adult members of the relevant national populations to qualify for
meaningful political participation;6 2 perhaps earlier republican
theorists and practitioners were more conservative in extending full
citizenship than meaningful participation would really have required.
Nothing in this sad side of republican history, however, requires
that modern republicanism follow the path of exclusion to the goal of
meaningful participation.63 At our present levels of wealth and our
present understanding of human potential, the opposite path,
inclusion, is clearly possible: insist that the republic give all its citizens
the wherewithal to participate fully in all aspects of economic and
political life. This would have three principle elements: first eliminate
any remaining vestiges of invidious discrimination; second, provide all
children of the republic a free and full education;64 and finally,
guarantee all citizens a secure starting place and safety-net in the
economy of the commonwealth. This last would include not only the
social insurance acceptable even to such right-liberals as F.H.A.
Hayek,65 but also the "new property" outlined a generation ago by
left-liberal Charles Reich66 and embodied in the economic opportunity
legislation of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society.67
Constitution, Am. Q., Spring 1962, at 3, 16 (discussing the need perceived by Madison
and others for a strong senate similar to that which was found in Rome so as to avoid
the "popular fluctuations" that plagued Athenian democracy); Edwin A. Miles, The
Young American Nation and the Classical World, 35 J. Hist. Ideas 259, 263 (1974).
62. See Miriam Galston, supra note 54, at 397.
[I]f Aristotle did not exclude certain classes of people from citizenship
because they were intrinsically incapable of citizenship, but only as a means
to ensure an end that can be accomplished today without resorting to such
drastic measures, then many of the exclusionary aspects of his political
thought would be instrumental and not choiceworthy in their own right.
Id.
63. See Morton J. Horowitz, supra note 34, at 150 ("Nevertheless, if one keeps all
the dangers in mind, there are ways to understand, from the perspective of a
contemporary egalitarian, the richness of the republican tradition," at least one
version of which contained "a very powerful commitment to political equality.").
64. See infra at Part II.A.2.C.
65. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 119-20 (1962).
66. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964); see also William
Ff. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1335 (1991) (describing a
property theory between classic liberalism and socialism, based in part on the
republican tradition).
67. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701 (repealed 1981); see 42 U.S.C. § 2861 ("[T]he purpose of this part
is to assist migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their families to improve their living
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What's more, nothing inherent in republicanism requires that
republican citizenship stop at traditional national frontiers. As its
citizenship can be extended downward domestically, so it can be
extended outward internationally. Classical republicanism, indeed, is
at once pre-nationalist and potentially anti-nationalist, even globalist.
Rome, as Milton reminds us, was a territorial empire long before it
became a political empire. And Rome, we should remember, was not
only a multi-national, but also a multicultural empire, willing, even
eager, to extend its citizenship to loyal non-Latin elites under its
dominion.
Consider a singular, but not single example, Paul the Apostle. Born
a Roman citizen in the city of Tarsus in modern Turkey," Paul never
saw any incompatibility between that citizenship and his membership
in various Jewish religious sects, first the orthodox Pharisees, then the
heterodox Christians. Nor did he feel any compunction about
invoking imperial law, with apparent efficacy, against a wide range of
antagonists: prison guards in the Roman colony of Macedonia,69 local
rulers7" and Roman authorities71 in the semi-autonomous kingdom of
Judea. And the republican historian Tacitus, disheartened by the
decline he perceived in classical republican virtue in the early days of
the empire, was more than happy to find many of those very virtues in
Rome's mortal enemies, the Germans.72
Republican expansion, of course, has historically had a darker side.
Rome undeniably expanded by conquest, first the region of Latium,
then the whole of the Italian peninsula, and, ultimately, the better part
of the known world. Some critics, accordingly, fear that republics are
inherently imperialistic. Like the related charge that republics must
be militaristic at home, this one has little merit.
For one thing, it is more a strength than a weakness of republican
values that they know no national bounds, even as they know no racial
or gender constraints. And even if republics, founded on such
conditions and develop skills necessary for a productive and self-sufficient life in an
increasingly complex and technological society."); id. § 2862(b)(1) (providing for "day
care for children, education, health services, improved housing and sanitation .
legal advice and representation, and consumer training and counseling").
68. Acts 22:3.
69. Acts 16:37 ("But Paul said to them [the magistrates], 'They have beaten us
publicly, uncondemned, men who are Roman citizens, and have thrown us into
prison; do they now cast us out secretly'?"') (RSV).
70. Acts 23 (describing Paul's rescue by a contingent of Roman soldiers from an
ambush planned by local authorities in Jerusalem).
71. Acts 25:10-12, 26:30-32 (describing Paul's successful appeal to Festus, Roman
procurator of Judea, that he be tried by Roman imperial law rather than local Jewish
law).
72. But see Hadas, supra note 17, at xii ("It is a temptation to which many have
succumbed to look upon the Germania as a sort of Utopia, a conscious idealization of
a primitive and unspoiled people calculated to chasten and reform the decadent
Romans.").
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universalizable principles, are inherently expansionist, their mode of
expansion need not be wars of aggression. Nor need their
expansionism spring either from the economic imperative that Lenin
saw at the root of imperialism or from the "white man's burden" that
more sanctimonious modern Europeans saw as justifying their
overseas excursions. Rather, the republic's conflicts can be wars of
liberation, not conquest, its imperatives the principles of Woodrow
Wilson's Fourteen Points and Franklin Roosevelt's Four Freedoms-
maybe even George Bush's New World Order.
Seen in this light, the only real limitation to the expansion of
republican citizenship, internally or externally, is a practical
consideration, identified even by thoughtful left-liberals: a republican
form of government cannot admit into citizenship too many who have
not yet internalized republican values.73 As we said at the outset of
this subsection, the republic requires, in an irreducible core of its
citizens, at least a modicum of distinctly republican civic virtue. To
understand how the republic will ensure that its citizens, native-born
as well as naturalized, embody those virtues, we must turn to the third
essential element of republicanism, the social construction of the
individual.
c. Social Construction of the Individual
Civic republicans all hold some version of the view that the
individual is socially constructed.74 Social constructionism is, of
course, a notorious bogey in the modern academy." At its most
aggressive, it may well collapse into the deep paradox, if not circular
absurdity, that all reality is socially constructed. But civic
republicanism embraces a much milder form. As even its critics
admit, this is "an uncontroversial descriptive insight into human
behavior in the modern world," which "[e]ven the most individualistic
modern legal or political theorist would not dispute": "a person's
views and attitudes are shaped in large part by the person's
experiences with other people, political institutions, and the larger
social context. 76
This amounts to a pretty commonsensical position. Adam and Eve
may not have had navels, but the rest of us do; Abe Lincoln was not
born in a cabin he built with his own hands. Even those who deny
that it takes a village to raise a child must admit that it takes some
community of responsible adults. Libertarians and anarchists may, in
their minimalist states and states of nature, march to their different
73. See Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 93-95 (1980).
74. Gey, supra note 1, at 822.
75. For a survey of the social constructionist controversy, see Ian Hacking, Are
You a Social Constructionist, Lingua Franca, May/June 1999, at 65-72.
76. Gey, supra note 1, at 811.
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drummers or dance to their own music, but it will have been our world
that gave them drumming and dance, marching and music - not to
mention feet and ears. Nor was this perspective, for all its promotion
by post-moderns, lost on classical republicans. As Livy said of the
pre-republican Romans, "all were at one in wishing kingly rule, for
they had not experienced the sweets of liberty. ' 7
Critics, particularly left-liberals, fault civic republicans not for this
descriptive position, which they themselves tend to share, but for their
normative response to it. Civic republicans not only accept that
human beings are to some extent socially constructed; they further
maintain that the state has a proper, and properly large, role in that
process. The republic may-no, must-inculcate republican values.
Liberals, by contrast, insist that the state should be neutral toward
competing notions of goodness, whether in the form of individual
excellence or civic virtue."
Some republicans are admittedly a bit scary in their lack of
specificity as to both the method and the aim of their state's role in
socially constructing the individual. But it does not follow that a less
scary republicanism can't be formulated consistent not only with the
other elements of republicanism, but also with left-liberalism itself.
All the republic needs, paradoxically, is the power to empower its
citizens with a liberal education. The means need only be state
authority and resources for a system of compulsory primary and
secondary education - the first of which, of course, the state already
has. And the end need only be this: to provide basic skills necessary
for participation in the republic, including meaningful discussion
about the fundamental values of the republic.
The content of this republican education need not include either
quasi-religious catechizing or Orwellian thought-control. Most
basically, such an education would have to cover the contemporary
equivalent of the three Rs, the basic skills of verbal and mathematical
literacy required for earning a living in a modern economy and
understanding policy debates in a self-governing polity. This latter
would have to include an understanding of the basic values of the
republic itself: civic virtue, organic community, and the social
construction of the individual.
To illustrate what a republican education would involve in the area
of values, as opposed to skills, consider the much fraught issue of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. Under republican principles of
universality and inclusiveness, "under God" would be strongly
suspect. The reference to the United States of America as "one
nation, indivisible," would require a lot of explanation, in both
directions. As we have seen, republicanism is nationalistic at most in
77. Livy, supra note 17, at 29.
78. See Gey, supra note 1, at 813.
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a provisional way, and many conscientious American republicans, our
schools would have to point out, were hardly wedded to the Union.
Their motto, to quote their mentor, must be "The Union, next to our
liberties, most dear. ' 79 And we would have to announce "with liberty
and justice for all" as high aspirations honored, at least historically, as
much in the breach as in the observance.
Even more problematic would be the form of the document, the
pledge as a kind of secular creed, recited as a patriotic ritual in an
environment that is hardly conducive to dissent. At the very least, the
republic would have to let dissidents opt out with no penalty beyond
self-identification as a dissenter. At best, the republic would probably
dispense with such displays altogether, on the grounds that what they
cost in coercion and stigmatization on balance outweighs any
information they convey or patriotic sentiment they instill.
The republic could thus do well-maybe better-without a Pledge
of Allegiance. But it could not do without a class in basic civics.
Perhaps more important to the preservation of republican values is a
course in republican history.80 Without it we risk the situation Tacitus
lamented in the era of Augustus: "How few were left who had seen
the republic!"81
Admittedly, this kind of education cannot be pursued without a
measure of coercion. But that coercion is much less extensive than
the Orwellian world critics depict, and the republican state would
have a great incentive to keep it as little as possible. Children are not
likely to be entirely happy about having to go to any school at all, but
the republic has good reason to make them appreciate, even enjoy,
their education.
Republicans, having grasped the nettle of an affirmative role for
their state in the social construction of its citizens, are not
embarrassed by the observation that liberal education is not value-
neutral.8 2 It is enough for them that the ultimate end of liberal
education is the ability to question the value of everything, including
79. John Niven, John C. Calhoun and the Price of Union 173 (1988) (quoting John
C. Calhoun).
80. See infra Part III.
81. Tacitus, Annals L3, in The Complete Works of Tacitus, supra note 17, at 5.
82. See Nomi Maya Stoltzenberg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out":
Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 Harv. L.
Rev. 581, 655 (1993) [hereinafter Liberal Education].
Civic republicanism, at least in its modem incarnation, professes the
necessity of value-inculcation, yet among the values whose inculcation it
requires-the "civic virtues" of a republican society-are the very principles
that define a liberal society dedicated to the toleration of diverse values and
the necessity of a free choice among them, based on the critical-objective
faculties of thought.
Id.; see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62
U. Chi. L. Rev. 131 (1995).
2003] 1207
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
liberal education. 3 Nor are they troubled that an education that
empowers citizens to live as full republican citizens, questioning
everything, necessarily precludes their full membership in certain
other communities, particularly the patriarchal or otherwise
authoritarian, where some are forbidden to question anything, and all
are forbidden to question something. To be explicit, a little girl
educated in the republic's schools may choose not to return, when she
reaches majority and full citizenship, to her father's fundamentalist
church or Orthodox temple; she may choose, instead, to leave behind
the ersatz seventeenth-century farm or medieval ghetto and to move
ahead into the new millennium's cosmopolis. To be blunt, so be it for
her-and so much the better for the republic.
B. Theory and Metatheory
Contemporary civic republicans have thus constructed from basic
elements of traditional republicanism a theoretical house that should
accommodate, with more than moderate comfort, not only civic
republicans themselves, but also their left-liberal critics. In some
significant respects, indeed, the civic republican edifice offers a better
home for left-liberals than they have been able to construct for
themselves. It gives a better account of publicly-imposed liberal
education, in response to communitarian critiques, 4 and it shores up
the right-wing of the house of liberalism against sinking into
libertarianism and more economically-oriented versions of
individualism.
And yet there is a serious flaw in this edifice, which its left-liberal
critics have been correct to point out and which its republican builders
have not been particularly successful in repairing. What is worse, that
flaw lies at the foundation of the structure itself. This section first
examines the fundamental flaw of republican theory, then proposes a
solution.
83. Cf. Robert Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975).
84. See Miriam Galston, supra note 54, at 384-85 ("The reluctance among
contemporary [liberal] legal theorists to consider the possible moral conditions of the
deliberative enterprise is thus unreflective insofar as it exaggerates the coerciveness of
alternative theoretical approaches, while ignoring or understating the coerciveness of
its own teachings." (citation omitted)); Stoltzenberg, Liberal Education, supra note
82, at 659 ("Thus, not only is civic republicanism committed to the inculcation of
liberal individualist values, but the liberal individualist commitment to 'the free mind'
itself requires a certain kind of education-namely, education in the value of
diversity, reason, and individual choice.").
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1. The Problem: What's Below the Foundation? 5
Republicanism's fundamental flaw has two related, even reciprocal,
dimensions. To see the first dimension, we must look downward and
backward to the foundation on which republicanism rests and the
materials from which that foundation has been built, its concurrent
commitments to individual liberty and the common good. Where do
these fundamental republican principles come from, and what do they
themselves rest on?
To see the other dimension of the problem, we must look in the
other direction, upward and forward. What guarantees that the
foundation won't shift or be abandoned-even razed-by subsequent
remodelers? In particular, what will keep the architects of the
republic's future from abandoning its twin bases, individual liberty on
the right and the common good on the left, the one for
communitarism or the other for libertarianism? To put this criticism
most pointedly, republicans have built their house upon the sand, if
not in the air, where it may at any point list badly, even topple, toward
the left or the right.
Republicans' attempts to repair the first flaw have tended to worsen
the second. As we have seen, contemporary republican theorists have
tended to be left-liberals; along with left-liberals, they have mostly
taken to heart the post-modernist critique of foundationalism. On this
view, to say that values or norms have any ultimate, essential
foundation, or to attempt to derive a normative "ought" from any
descriptive "is," is impossible, if not pernicious. 7 Faced with this
yawning normative hole, republicans have made something of a virtue
of necessity, filling the substantive void with process.
On this view, republican values do not emerge from the mists of
metaphysics or metaethics (much less from the unmentionable
murkiness of revealed religion). Nor are they merely the sum of
arbitrary individual idiosyncrasies. Rather, they are forged in the
comfortable and familiar process of dialogue, discussion, or-to use
the big D-word-Deliberation. Republican values are made, not
found, and they are made right here, by us (Americans), meaningfully
participating in the prototypical republican process: public
deliberation.
Now this may well be true, but republicanism's critics have rightly
pointed out the danger of a serious inconsistency here. Granted,
85. In stating the problem, I am following the critique of Steven Gey, supra note
1, at 872-79. For other critiques along these lines, see works cited and summarized in
Kalman, supra note 10, at 326 n.76.
86. J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977); Rob Atkinson,
Beyond the New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 Md. L. Rev. 853 (1992).
87. See Barbara Herrnstein Smith, Contingencies of Value: Alternative
Perspectives for Critical Theory (1988) (arguing that foundationalism is necessarily
reactionary, paternalistic, and oppressive).
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republican values have emerged in some such way and will continue to
be shaped in just that way. But it does not follow that these values
are, in any transcendent sense, right or good; all that follows from
republicanism's anti-foundationalist principles is that these values are
here, shared by a more or less large constituency. Nor will it do, on
anti-foundationalist principles, to say that the values are "really" good
because they emerge from a process that is itself really good. Of that
assertion, it can always be asked, "Says who?" To answer "We, the
People" is at worst to beg the original question and at best to raise
another: "What (or Who) makes 'we, the people,' or our normative
pronouncements, 'really' good?" ("God" is a very good answer
theoretically,88 but a very bad answer politically.) Republican
theoreticians have struggled mightily, along with many another, to get
out of this circle-so far with no success whatsoever.
And it gets worse. By resting their core substantive values, liberty
and the commonweal, on the dynamic process of deliberation, civic
republicans run directly into the second aspect of their fundamental
problem: how to ensure that the outcomes of present and future
deliberation do not reject either individual liberty or the good of the
people as a whole, or even deliberation itself. As we have seen, when
their post-modernist assumptions made it necessary to reject absolute
value, civic republicans made process their cardinal virtue. But that
move threatens yet another vicious circle. If there is no absolute
against which to test the outcomes of republican process, what keeps
that process from producing anti-republican results? Indeed, if it is
process alone that is the measure of republican results, then does it
even make sense to ask whether a given result of the preferred
process is republican or not?
Left liberals have taken little comfort in republican reassurances
that this declension just won't happen, particularly with respect to
core liberal values like freedom of expression and association. Here
again, as an empirical matter, those assurances may well be true. But
here again, if they are, it would not follow, as a normative matter, that
what they assure is good.
The refurbished republican house thus has serious problems at its
base: on the one hand, how to ground its value system without
invoking unfashionable absolutes; on the other hand, how to
substitute process for substance without leaving all values, process as
well as substance, up for grabs, ultimately contingent on an uncertain,
even unpredictable, future.
88. See Arthur Allen Left, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 Duke L.J.
1229.
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2. The Solution: Just More Republicans, All the Way Down
But that need not be the end of the story. There is a way past this
fundamental problem, though a way not much recommended even by
republicans themselves. Implicit in traditional republicanism is an
answer both to the meta-theoretical problem of foundationlessness
and the practical problem of preserving core values. It is not an
answer that many proponents of republicanism will like,89 but it is, I
think, an answer entirely consistent with the republican tradition.
This way around the problem at republicanism's foundation is
reminiscent of the apocryphal sage's defense of his faith's
cosmological myth, the notion that the universe rests on the back of a
great turtle. When asked what the turtle itself stands on, the sage
replied, "Just more turtles, all the way down."
The essence of the answer, there as here, lies in making a virtue of
another necessity, admitting that, at bottom, republicanism has no
foundation but its history and no future that is not grounded in that
history. As we have seen, Republicanism has grasped that nettle
already in its embrace of the proposition that human beings are
socially constructed. And, as we have also seen, republicans have
gone the next step, assigning an active role to the state in the
construction of citizens who embody republican virtues. But
republicans have balked at the final step: conceding that the basis of
their tradition's vision rests, ultimately, on nothing grander than the
continued appeal of that tradition itself.
Thus we have found the foundation of the republic, and it is us.
More precisely, it is our continued commitment to the substantive
republican values of individual freedom and public welfare and the
procedural value of public deliberation. To the anti-foundationalist
denial of normative absolutes, with its implicit invitation to either
nihilistic despair of any values or relativistic acceptance of all values,
republicans may, and must, simply assert their own adoption of
traditional republican values. We believe in them, not in the sense
that we are convinced of their objective truth, but in the very different
sense that we are committed to them as the basis of our political and
moral lives.
This nicely cuts the Gordian knot of whether republican
deliberative process can reject republican substantive values, whether
republicanism rests ultimately on process or substance. Stated in
those ahistorical terms, the puzzle cannot be resolved, and, as
republicanism's critics have shown, every answer simply slides into
one or the other of twin antinomies. Viewed historically and
existentially, however, the conundrum simply disappears. Historical
89. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 163 (noting criticism that, "for all their
postmodern posing and emphasis on dialogue, Michelman and Sunstein still searched
for objective foundations of justice and common good").
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republicanism is a movement in which the values of dialogic process
and left-liberal substance are inextricably interwoven. Given our own
citizenry's deep background in that history, and given an educational
system in which future citizens are trained in that tradition, our
citizens are unlikely to abandon either republican process or
republican substance. We fortunately are starting with good citizens
and we mean aggressively to make them better. The guarantee of
where we are going is the point from which we have started and the
direction in which we are headed.
But no republic is perfect, including ours. And republican
historians from the beginning have reminded us, if I may borrow their
rhetoric, that the blandishments of comfortable servitude always
threaten to undermine the labors of liberty-the people can be, and
have been, seduced."' Even then, though, all is not lost. When that
has happened before-and if it should happen again-republican
history affords ample answer: Caesar had his Brutus; Charles I, his
Cromwell. The great republicans never took regicide lightly; Lincoln
doubtlessly trembled to suspend the Great Writ. Those, including
Cromwell and Lincoln, who choose to sacrifice deliberative process,
however flawed, or the rule of law, however briefly, to guarantee
liberty and welfare by other means have been judged most strictly.
But they did what they had to do-what defense of the
commonwealth demanded.
Subsequent republicans may still debate whether their choices were
wise and most consistent with and conducive to republican norms.
But no one can seriously doubt that, as they saw themselves, they
were protectors of the commonwealth; much less can anyone deny
that they are part of the republican tradition and thus the republican
repertoire of responses. Republicanism, like our Constitution, is
neither a simple proposition nor a tidy set of principles. But it is not a
suicide pact, a petard on which its proponents need hoist themselves.
90. See Tacitus, Annals 1.2, in The Complete Works of Tacitus, supra note 17, at 3-
4.
When after the destruction of Brutus and Cassius there was no longer any
army of the Commonwealth, when Pompeius was crushed in Sicily, and
when, with Lepidus pushed aside and Antonius slain, even the Julian faction
had only Caesar [Octavius] left to lead it, then, dropping the title of triumvir,
and giving out that he was a Consul, and was satisfied with a tribune's
authority for the protection of the people, Augustus won over the soldiers
with gifts, the populace with cheap corn, and all men with the sweets of
repose, and so grew greater by degrees, while he concentrated in himself the
functions of the Senate, the magistrates, and the laws.
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III. THE USE AND ABUSE OF HISTORY: TOWARD A MORE
REPUBLICAN REPUBLICANISM
Republicanism must use history-in particular, its own history-to
both undergird and guarantee its present-day program. My reliance
on historical republicanism is admittedly radical, in both senses of the
word. It goes back to the roots of republicanism in a way that breaks
rather sharply with present theory. On the other hand, however,
invoking history is hardly a novel suggestion in the defense of
republicanism, original or revived. As we saw at the outset, several
strands of the Republican Revival have looked to history for just such
help. This final Part looks more closely at that historical turn and its
critics.
A. Past and Present, or Looking Backward
This section looks at two related aspects of republican history: first,
the use that republicans are now making of traditional republican
norms, then the norms that traditional republicans used in their own
histories. Covering both topics in so short a compass cannot help
some of the comic hubris, or chutzpah, of Hedda Gabler's ambitious
admirer; like his first work, "a big book, dealing with the march of
civilization," my coverage will have to be "in broad outline, as it
were."
91
1. The History of Republican Norms
Left-liberal theorists in constitutional law, building upon historians
of republicanism, claimed that the American Constitution of 1787
embodied not just liberal principles, but also republican principles.
These latter principles, they argued, could be used as legitimate
grounds for criticizing what they saw as the troublingly individualist,
anti-welfarist drift of the current United States Supreme Court.
Critics-quite often including historians of republicanism-have
responded that this line of reasoning involved a fatal anachronism. As
these critics read the history of republicanism in America, that
movement, strong though it may have been in the Revolution, had
spent its force and been thoroughly replaced by newly-regnant
liberalism by the time of the Constitutional Convention.92
Contemporary republicans respond that the historical record is not so
clear; it remains to be seen whether liberalism totally displaced
republicanism or whether republicanism merged into or otherwise
91. Henrik Ibsen, Hedda Gabler, in Eleven Plays of Henrik Ibsen 498, 518
(Modern Library, n.d.).
92. Kalman, supra note 10, at 175-76 ("There was no historical pedigree,




influenced liberalism itself-whether, indeed, eighteenth-century
liberalism and republicanism were ever so distinct as critics' total
displacement hypothesis presupposes. 3
Several aspects of this debate warrant our attention. The first, and
most important for our purposes, is the fact that the debate occurs in
the context of constitutional law and, more particularly, in debates
between left-liberals and right-liberals of a distinctly originalist cast.
The former, in an effort to answer the latter on their own terms, have
attempted to find the roots of their own left-liberal policy preferences
not only in the Founder's minds and hearts but also in their written
product, the Constitution's text. 4 If those preferences really informed
the text of the Constitution itself-still a much disputed point-then
that would indeed be the basis for a strong originalist argument
against right-wing originalism.95
Note, however, that the converse does not necessarily follow. Even
if the Constitution did not, as a matter of historical fact, embody
republican strands of the sort left-liberals are looking for, left-liberals
can still argue against right-liberal originalists on other grounds. They
can, for example, argue that originalism in anything but a very weak
form is a poor constitutional theory.96 Alternatively, even granting
that strong originalism is a viable constitutional theory, they can argue
that it does not form an adequate basis for current right-liberal
developments in constitutional law. Even if the Constitution is a
Lockean compact, and even if its Lockean principles must be
scrupulously honored, they may not take us where the current Court
is going.97 That debate is well beyond the ambit of our discussion; for
present purposes, it is enough to note that it would not be precluded
by a finding that republican constitutional theorists have gotten their
intellectual history of the Constitution wrong, just as their critics
contend.
Moreover, left-liberal constitutional law scholars, as republicans,
might broaden the debate even more in a way that would make
93. See Stolzenberg, Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1045.
94. Kalman, supra note 10, at 139 (noting efforts of "some legal liberals.., to
appropriate originalism for themselves" and "advance alternative interpretations of
the Founding to justify legal liberalism").
95. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 604 ("The American constitutional culture
gives special weight to the convictions of those who ratified constitutional provisions,
and ... I believe that this interpretive practice is legitimate.").
96. See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 555 ("A particular constitutional theory may
hold, for example, that the events of the Founding are relevant in resolving
constitutional questions, but that factors such as subsequent practice are
dispositive.").
97. See Horowitz, supra note 34, at 149 ("As we begin to examine the reasons for
the republican revival, we see that interest group pluralist and individualist
conceptions of political and constitutional theory that have come to dominate
constitutional ideology were not present in the thinking that was still prevalent after
1776.").
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republican principles almost indisputably relevant. For all but the
narrowest textualists, constitutional interpretation must be informed
by an understanding of traditional concepts of ordered liberty.9"
Republican values, even if not directly imported into the Constitution,
are certainly part of the Anglo-American legal and political tradition,
and that tradition is itself part of a larger and longer republican
conversation. Consider a single example, Milton's Defense of the
People of England. Assigned the task of defending the
Commonwealth's execution of Charles I, Milton consciously
addressed himself to an international, not domestic, audience, and he
carefully invoked the regicidal tradition of Republican Rome, not
merely the traditional laws of England. Even if republicanism is not
in our Constitution, in the narrow four-corners-of-the-parchment
sense, it is certainly in our constitutional culture, more broadly
conceived. As one scholar of the American Revolution has remarked,
American Whigs "were looking backward to the constitution of Sir
Edward Coke, to the constitution that beheaded Charles I and
dethroned James 11.99
And legal scholars outside constitutional law are even less
constrained by the outcome of historical debates about the directness
of the role of republicanism in the shaping of the Constitution.100 As
we have seen, legal ethics scholars invoke republican strands in the
history of the American legal profession as proof, not that the
currently dominant conception of American lawyering is rooted in
republicanism, but just the reverse. Their point is that a viable
counter-tradition exists and that we may turn to that tradition for
contemporary alternatives. What they need to show is not a
continuous line of development from a republican past to the
dominant model of today, but rather that the dominant model of
today is merely that and not the sole model ever followed by
American lawyers.
2. The Norms of Republican History
That latter, broader invocation of republican history invites a
broader criticism of republicanism's reliance on history. Importing
values from the past into the present is sometimes said to violate the
norms of modern historical scholarship. According to those norms the
past has no inherent normative authority over the present. The fact
that particular values figured in the normative systems of the past,
whether moral, legal, or aesthetic, gives them no necessary normative
98. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. John Phillip Read, Constitutional History of the American Revolution 5
(1993).
100. See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 555 ("Nearly every constitutional theorist
believes history adds something to her account.").
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authority now. The job of the intellectual historian, on this view, is to
reconstruct what people in the past believed and valued, and to try to
explain why. But this task is purely descriptive; it has no prescriptive
role for the present or future."1"
For those who profess some form of meta-ethical skepticism, like
most modern republicans and post-modernists generally, this criticism
is but a corollary of what they take to be a truism: you can't derive a
normative "ought" from a descriptive "is." The same holds true in the
case of history for any descriptive "was." Republicans can accept this
point quite easily (most would probably insist upon it) because that is
not what they are doing. They are turning to the past, not for
directions as to what they normatively must do, but for what they may
do, for proof; not of what is required, but of what is at least
conceivable as a point of aspiration and perhaps possible as a matter
of realizable accomplishment."2 On this view, others have sought a
society that both narrowly restricts government interference in
matters of conscience and broadly mandates government action for
the common good, and have moved their own societies in that
direction. So, too, may we.
And some modern republicans, like many past republicans, are
looking for something more as well. They are looking not merely for
a viable political platform, but also for role models. This is quite clear
in legal ethics. Scholars critical of the dominant, highly individualist
model of lawyering are not just looking for alternative theoretical
models. They are also looking for particular lawyers who have lived
admirable, emulatable lives according to those models. Their hero-
and here "hero" is not too strong a word-is Louis Brandeis. They
hold him up, not so much as the originating theorist of their preferred
model of lawyering, but as its inspiration and embodiment, even as
they urge reforms in his reformist model.' 3
Celebrating heroes, of course, is rather out of fashion; we of the
post-Watergate era are more inclined to look downward for clay feet
than upward for laurelled brows. Republican history, however, has
always had room for both perspectives. As Livy put it in his History
of Rome:
101. Kalman, supra note 10, at 154 (arguing that legal theorists mistakenly
interpreted republican Pocock as having "imbued the republican synthesis with a
'prescriptive authority'). "For the historian, the past is relevant to the present
insofar as it shows how other people lived their lives," but "[i]t does not explicitly tell
historians or their contemporaries how to conduct their own." Id. at 180; Stolzenberg,
Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1045-46 (describing historians' criticism of
lawyers' prescriptive use of history).
102. See Rob Atkinson, Liberating Lawyers: Divergent Parallels in Intruder in the
Dust and To Kill a Mockingbird, 49 Duke L.J. 601 (1999) (discussing a similar
borrowing of moral models from literature).
103. David Luban, Lawyers and Justice 169-74 (1998); William H. Simon, The
Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics 127-37 (1998).
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It is this particular that makes the study of history salutary and
profitable: patterns of every sort of action are set out on a luminous
monument for your inspection, and you may choose models for
yourself and your state to imitate, and faults, base in their issue as in
their inception, to avoid." 4
And his fellow republican Tacitus, at least on this point, was in accord:
My purpose is not to relate at length every motion, but only such as
were conspicuous for excellence or notorious for infamy. This I
regard as history's highest function, to let no worthy action be
uncommemorated, and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as a
terror to evil words and deeds. 
15
Modern historians may object that this is not what they do, but they
can hardly object, without transgressing their own appointed
professional bounds, that this is improper for others to do.
To see why this is so, it will be helpful to invoke a set of distinctions
drawn by Nietzsche in The Use and Abuse of History. Nietzsche's
analysis identifies three modes of historiography: the monumental, the
antiquarian, and the critical. Each, in his view, is both proper within
its own ambit and essential to the proper functioning of the others and
to the enterprise of history as a whole. Antiquarian history, with the
indiscriminant nostalgia of a hometown museum or high school
scrapbook, cherishes all that is old and familiar. Monumental history
sorts through this veritable attic of antiques to rediscover and dust off
for us, very much in the mode of Livy, models of excellence to
emulate and (Nietzsche being Nietzsche) surpass. Critical history,
finally, keeps monumental history honest, mostly by cutting its heroes
down to size. Taken together, Nietzsche argued, this historiographic
triad offers a vital alternative to the purportedly objective
historiography that his nineteenth-century contemporaries were trying
to build on value-free, scientific foundations.
Modern historians themselves generally reject the nineteenth-
century model of historiography as a purely objective science to be
dispassionately pursued; they tend to see that model as either
unattainable or undesirable, or both. But what they embrace is much
closer to that model than to Nietzsche's more traditional alternative,
history with an essentially inspirational goal. Whatever the merits of
their preference, it hardly gives them warrant to dismiss Nietzsche's
model altogether. It may not measure up to their standards of history,
but those standards themselves give them no warrant to condemn the
use to which others put history. In particular, their methods may
eschew evaluating the past for purposes of inspiring the present and
future. But their methods do not entail the grounds for denying such
evaluation by others outside their field. By their own terms, they can
104. Livy, supra note 17, at 18.
105. Tacitus, Annals 3.65, in The Complete Works of Tacitus, supra note 17, at 137.
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appropriately tell us what was what and explain why it was, but they
cannot tell us what or whom to admire. It does not follow from their
professional renunciation of evaluation of the past in their work as
historians that they can proscribe evaluation of the past by those who
are outside that professional field. They may well deny themselves
and their fellow historians the prerogative to distinguish heroes from
villains, good from evil. But they, as historians, cannot deny that
prerogative to the rest of us.
On the other hand, their mode of history can be very useful to those
outside their field, particularly to those inclined to use history in more
traditional modes. Monumental history, as Nietzsche was quick to
admit, by its very nature tends toward hagiography, toward prettifying
its heroes and caricaturing its villains."6 Accordingly, as he himself
insisted, it needs the constant corrective of a more critical, if never
purely objective, brand of history."" Thus Livy, the prototype of
monumental historians of the republic, has been caught out in a
number of particulars, eager as he was to instill republican values."8
One of those very values, however, was truthfulness,"9 including
historical accuracy. By this baseline measure of modern history, " "
which he explicitly took for his own,"' Livy, for all his patriotism,
ranks rather high." 2 Thus it is best for ourselves and our historical
heroes, according to our heroes who were historians, if we seek to see
them as Oliver the Protector instructed his portraitist to depict him to
us: Warts and all."1
3
106. Frederick Nietzsche, The Use and Abuse of History 15 (Adrian Collins trans.,
Julius Kraft ed., 2d ed. 1957) ("[Als long as the past is principally used as a model for
imitation, it is always in danger of being a little altered and touched up and brought
nearer to fiction."). Much the same has been said of legal scholars who, according to
critics, "notoriously pick and choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that
serve their purposes." Flaherty, supra note 11, at 554.
107. Nietzsche, supra note 106, at 20-22; cf Flaherty, supra note 11, at 551
("Among the academics and professionals who make up the audience which
constitutional theorists seek to persuade, it is axiomatic that any argument drawing
from another established discipline is convincing to the extent that it abides by the
conventions of that discipline.").
108. See Livy, supra note 17, at 8-9.
109. See id. at 210 (faulting Hannibal for having "no scruple to truth or sanctity...
no respect for oaths or religion").
110. See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 552 ("Perhaps the most basic [procedural norm
of modern professional historians] is simply getting elementary facts straight.").
111. Thus, at various points, he notes the unreliability of sources or laments the
difficulty of choosing among conflicting accounts. See, e.g., Livy, supra note 17, at 21,
24, 251 (choosing the most patriotically appealing account, but insisting that it is "the
version which is transmitted by most authorities and is confirmed by tradition").
112. See Moses Hadas and Joe P. Poe, Introduction to Livy, supra note 17, at 11
("In view of his patriotic objectives and his adherence to the modes of Hellenistic
historiography, the remarkable thing about Livy is not his shortcoming as a scientific
historian but his mature critical sense and his generally high reliability.").
113. See Antonia Fraser, Cromwell: The Lord Protector 472 (1973) (reporting
"warts and all" anecdote as "another example of a story, possible apocryphal, which
yet survives for the innate truth it is felt to contain about the character concerned"
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This raises a final objection from the historian: Who gets to say
what's a wart and what's a beauty-mark? Historians critical of the
Republican Revival have noted that it is highly selective of the
elements it borrows from the republicanism of the past.
Civic republicans eagerly attempt to jettison what they take to be
inessential baggage of republics past: specific evils like franchise
restrictions and slavery; more general problems including militarism,
elitism, misogyny, patriarchy, parochialism, and various other forms of
dominance or exclusion. 14  Some critics of the civic republican
program assert that these elements are not adventitious, but essential
to republicanism, an assertion addressed at various points in Part II.
The charge to consider here runs in another direction: not that civic
republicanism in its present form implies these admittedly bad
elements, but that traditional republicanism did. Because traditional
republicanism embodied these evils, then the current movement is not
a revival or a revision of the republican tradition, but some sort of
sham or imposter, a kind of sheep in wolf's clothing.115
Answering that charge again requires an appropriate division of
intellectual labor. Surely it is within the ambit of modern historians,
working in something analogous to Nietzsche's critical mode, to
identify elements of the belief system of past republicans, even to
distinguish those who identified themselves as republicans from those
who did not. Historical republicans and republicanism are,
respectively, people and parties of the past and the past, is
indisputably the historians' proper province. And that province can
also fairly be said to include this question: What elements of current
ideologies, republicanism and others, can be said to bear the stamp of
past republicanism?
It does not follow, however, that historians, as historians, have
anything to say about a very different set of questions: What may
those who currently identify themselves as republicans properly
borrow or jettison from the republican past; what historical figures are
"really" republican heroes, or villains; who, among various
contenders, are the "real" or "true" inheritors of the republican
tradition. These are matters for those who claim to be republicans
today to decide among themselves." 6 What they decide, and who and
and concluding that "the words do have an authentic Cromwellian ring").
114. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 160; Gey, supra note 1, at 804 n.5; Stolzenberg,
Civic Republicanism, supra note 8, at 1045.
115. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 175-76. But cf. Horowitz, supra note 34, at 152
("I am not saying that there is not some version of republicanism and rights that
would deeply resonate and be true to late eighteenth-century discourses.").
116. On this general point Mark Tushnet, a leading critic of the Republican
Revival, seems entirely in agreement: "Successors orient themselves to the tradition
by identifying some elements in their predecessors' thought to which they continue to
adhere and disregarding or explaining away other elements in that thought which they
feel compelled to reject." Mark Tushnet, The Concept of Tradition in Constitutional
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what influenced them and why, will all be matters for future historians
of republicanism. Whether they decided rightly or wrongly, from
their own normative perspective or from any other, is simply beyond
the purview of analytic history, as analytic historians themselves have
defined that purview.
We are free to choose to admire and emulate what we will from the
past; historians can tell us that we have got our facts wrong."7 When
they do, we who honor the republican tradition of historiography
should thank them for the correction, not only on our own behalf, but
also on behalf of our heroes themselves. But historians cannot, by
their own standards, tell us who to emulate or what to admire.' s It is
entirely for us to decide who our heroes are and what future, guided
by our heroes, we will build.' 9 If they would do that, they must put
aside the mantle of modern professional historian, worthy though that
mantle is, and join us and our heroes in our dialogue about the things
that really matter, our deliberation about who we are and what we will
become.12
B. Present and Future, or Looking Forward
This final section suggests several directions for that dialogue. It
first suggests some fruitful lines for future historical research, and then
projects how, fortified with the results of that research, we might
advance the republic into its own future, which is, of course, ours. As
Hedda's admirer admitted, "we know nothing of the future"; but, as
he insisted, "there is a thing or two to be said about it all the same."''
Historiography, 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 93, 94 (1987). Oddly, however, he seems to
deny adherents to the particular tradition of civic republicanism precisely that relation
to their own antecedents: "Precisely because republicanism was a complex of ideas
that made sense only as a unit, we cannot select from it only one or two strands ....
Unfortunately, neither can we re-appropriate it as a unit . I..." Id. at 98. Equally
oddly, Tushnet insists on speaking of republicanism either as an eighteenth-century
movement, id. at 93, or as that movement's subsequent adherents, id. at 94, in both
cases ignoring the much deeper roots of the republican tradition.
117. See Sunstein, supra note 48, at 605 ("[In contrast to historians' effort] to
reimagine the past," "the constitutional lawyer is trying to contribute to the legal
culture's repertoire of arguments and political/legal narratives that place a (stylized)
past and present into a trajectory leading to a desired future.").
118. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 171 ("Though [we] historians may be the only
ones whose primary interest is in historicizing the past, why should we criticize others
for using it in different ways?").
119. This, it seems to me, is quite consistent with Mark Tushnet's "modest
conclusion" about the Republican Revival: "It shows us that we must constitute our
society for ourselves, aware of but neither bound by nor able to reproduce the
experiences of the past." Tushnet, supra note 116, at 98-99.
120. See Kalman, supra note 10, at 142-43 (describing how republican law
professors, following the suggestion of Richard Rorty, explicitly began dialogues with
the past).
121. Ibsen, supra note 91, at 548. If my speculations misfire, may I shoot myself in
no more vital an organ than the foot. He, alas, was not so lucky. Id. at 596. Like his,
my treatment of the future "falls into two sections." "The first deals with the civilizing
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1. The Future of Republican History, or a Republican Research
Agenda
Republican history, as we have seen, is history with a purpose.
Stated most generally, that purpose is to ensure that the future lives
up to the standards of the past and delivers on its dual promise:
protecting the people's liberty and promoting their welfare.
a. Broadening the Republican Base
The first and most important research project should be to expand
the house of republicanism. This would require broadening not so
much its theoretical scope as its cultural inclusiveness. The
Republican Revival has tended to look back on a mostly Western
European history and pantheon of heroes: the American Founders,
the English revolutionaries, the Renaissance emulators of the ancient
Roman Republic, the Roman republicans themselves. In an era of
increased internationalism and multiculturalism, the republican
movement needs to look for parallel developments in other cultures
and countries. In particular, because of both their cultural richness
and their geopolitical importance, we need to look at the non-Latin
Christian culture of eastern (mostly Slavic) Europe; the world of the
third great Western monotheism, Islam; and the ancient and rich
cultures of the Indian subcontinent, eastern Asia, and sub-Saharan
Africa. Surely in some or all of these cultures we will find historical
moments, if not contemporary movements, that share republican
values.
To see how useful it might be to find such connections, consider but
a single example: the contemporary conflict of Western culture and
fundamentalist Islam. By pointing to several examples of very
different kinds of Islam, we may well be able to make common cause
with members of the world Muslim community whose traditional
values-traditional Islamic values-are entirely compatible with our
own. We know that a Muslim culture of extraordinary diversity and
tolerance flourished in medieval Iberia; Christians, Muslims, and Jews
lived together for centuries under Islamic law and the Arabic
language. 22  We know that their common culture fostered and
preserved texts, especially by Greek authors, that we consider
fundamental to the European canon. For all the anti-modernism of
many elements of today's fundamentalist Islam, we know that
forces of the future"; "the second... forecasting the probable line of development."
Id. But I am, if anything, more presumptuous than he: in my second part I suggest not
just one line of development, but two.
122. Maria Rosa Menocal, Culture in the Time of Tolerance: AI-Andalus as a
Model for Our Own Time, Address Before the Middle East Legal Studies Seminar




medieval Islamic culture equaled or exceeded that of the Christian
west in mathematics, medicine, and astronomy.
But we must, as conscientious historians and lawyers conscious of
the standards of historical accuracy, recognize the possibility that, in
at least some cultures, there simply are no plausible close parallels to
anything remotely like modern Western culture. That prospect
suggests a second related project: examining the extent to which
modern Western culture has been willing and able to incorporate
exogenous elements and the extent to which constituents of modern
Western culture have themselves come from outside. With respect to
the former, for example, we know that the Roman republicans
themselves were quite willing to learn from the Greeks, even to graft
the very origins of their capital and their people onto the formative
Greek epic of the fall of Troy.'23
Moreover, Europe itself has not always had what we now think of
as a European culture. As we offer the European vision of
republicanism to the world, it would be well to remind ourselves and
to tell the world that for most of Europe's own peoples and for much
of their history, the republican tradition has been distinctly foreign
and unfamiliar (as, for that matter, were all three forms of Abrahamist
monotheism: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).
b. Testing Trends Against Traditions
Even as we reach out to include other cultures in an expanding
republicanism, we must constantly test the contents of that
republicanism against the republican past. Let me give just a single
example here, from the narrower topic of this symposium,
professional responsibility. For nearly two decades now, the
American legal profession has been in the midst of a professionalism
crusade.12 4 No small part of that crusade has been the goal of
restoring the legal profession to its fundamental values. One of these
values is taken to be civility. 25 Without further specification, civility
would seem to be an indispensably republican value, something allied
to the core republican notion of civic virtue. Yet, when one looks at
some of the elaborations of civility widely current today, one wonders.
Civility as currently understood means a kind of categorical, across
the board "niceness," not a contextually sensitive, rebuttable
presumption of mutually respectful behavior.
Many central moral figures in the Western moral and religious
tradition, the prophet Jesus and the patriarch Jacob chief among
123. Livy, supra note 17; Virgil, The Aeneid 3-4 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Alfred
A. Knopf, Inc. 1992).
124. See generally Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism
Crusade, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 259 (1995).
125. See id. at 275-76.
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them, would not fit well into this Procrustean notion of civility.1 26 The
same could also be said of Cicero. Without doubt, he was both one of
the most revered martyrs in the republican pantheon and one of the
most respected of Roman lawyers;127 as we saw at the outset, Milton's
brief for the English Commonwealth rested largely on the precedent
of Cicero's defense of Brutus. But Plutarch, himself no small fan of
Cicero, tells us that Cicero simply could not resist the acerbic retort,
even the ad hominem insult. 128  Perhaps Cicero should have been
nicer; Plutarch suggests that his sarcasm sometimes undercut his
rhetorical powers. But it is at least worth noting another possibility:
perhaps we should re-think the fetish we have made of Mister Rogers'
mannerliness.
c. Rehabilitating Republican Heroes, and Heroic Republics
Students of republicanism, to their credit, have not been shy about
including erstwhile pariahs in their pantheon. To take but the clearest
example, their principal bridge between ancient and modern
republicanism, Machiavelli, 129 is, in popular parlance, the very eponym
of political skull-duggery. With an eye toward a similar rehabilitation,
I recommend that republican scholars, both in history and in other
disciplines, reconsider the English Commonwealth and its principal
statesman: Oliver Cromwell.
This third project is by no means of strictly antiquarian interest;
rather, it bears directly on the first two, expanding the republican tent
and re-evaluating our own contemporary commitments. With respect
to the first, rehabilitating Oliver in particular and the Commonwealth
interregnum more generally would permit a much-needed expansion
of today's republican movement. Contemporary left-liberalism is
notoriously out of touch with people of traditional religious affiliation,
especially those who profess evangelical forms of Christianity. Mutual
support, strong in the Civil Rights movement, has diminished as the
political left has turned to broader, and perhaps deeper, social and
economic issues.3' Yet it was precisely the antecedents of most
126. Rob Atkinson, Br'er Rabbit Professionalism: A Homily on Moral Heroes and
Lawyerly Mores, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 137 (1999).
127. See Fink, supra note 45, at 5 (citing Cicero as the chief classical inspiration of
the seventeenth-century English republicans); Pettit, supra note 19, at 19 ("This
tradition had its origins in classical Rome, being associated in particular with the
name of Cicero.").
128. Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans 1070 (John Dryden
trans., Modern Library 1932) ("Cicero's love of mockery often ran him into scurrility;
and in his love of laughing away serious arguments in judicial cases by jests and
facetious remarks, with a view to the advantage of his clients, he paid too little
attention to what was decent .... ").
129. See, e.g., J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political
Thought and the Atlantic Revolutionary Tradition (1975).
130. Stephen Carter, God's Name in Vain: The Wrongs and Rights of Religion in
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evangelical denominations in the Anglo-American world who formed
the core of support for the English Commonwealth; the support
tended to last longest among the lower-class and lesser-educated.
Even James Harrington, the darling of modern republicans, was
thoroughly imbued with the religious tone and terminology of the
age.13 As one modern student of seventeenth-century republicanism
has noted, "In republican minds, and in Milton's mind, the
relationship between civic and religious virtue is a close one."''
And just as a re-examination of the Commonwealth could help
revive ties between the contemporary secular left and the traditional
religious left, so it could help the former reassess its own positions.
Somewhat surprisingly, theorists of contemporary republicanism have
taken as their paragons James Harrington and his epigoni.'33
Harrington was certainly a republican theorist and propagandist; his
Oceana may have been as radical as Milton's "Ready and Easy Way
to Establish a Free Commonwealth." But Harrington was neither a
regicide nor a prominent leader during the revolution. And the
followers of Harrington, who himself published nothing after the
Restoration of the monarchy in 1660, made from their master's work a
position much more conservative than the original.13 1 In the words of
one student of the period, "They succeeded in making him a great
figure after 1688, a prophet of the rule of the propertied and the
British Empire.' ' 3  Among more active revolutionaries and less
compromised branches of the revolutionary movement, modern
republicans might find more inspiring and more palatable models.
The American Revolutionaries certainly did.'36
Politics 35, 44 (2000).
131. Christopher Hill, The Experience of Defeat: Milton and Some
Contemporaries 193, 199 (1984); see also Pocock, supra note 129, at 399 (discussing
coordination of Roman Republican and Christian apocalyptic elements in Oceana)
132. Blair Worden, Milton's Republicanism and the Tyranny of Heaven, in
Machiavelli and Republicanism 225, 230 (Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and
Maurizio Viroli eds., 1990).
133. See Pettit, supra note 19, at 19.
134. Hill, supra note 131, at 201-06.
135. Id. at 206; see also Fink, supra note 45, at 188-89 ("[N]o one can contemplate
the development of British imperial policy without believing that the Roman-inspired
imperialism of Harrington was an important determinant in the intellectual pedigree
of that system .... ").
136. See Bailyn, supra note 17, at 34 (noting the origins of the English eighteenth-
century radical political thought that most inspired American Revolutionaries as "the
radical social and political thought of the English Civil War and Commonwealth
period"); id. at 35 ("The colonists identified themselves with these seventeenth
century heroes of liberty."); see also Worden, supra note 132, at 227 ("The
development and variation of republican theory across those three generations [from
the 1650s through the 1690s] are less imposing than the continuity, even the repetition
of a body of ideas which the work of Zera Fink, Caroline Robbins, Felix Raab, and
John Pocock has brightly illuminated.").
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In particular, we might look to Milton's candidate, Cromwell
himself. As a first step toward Cromwell's re-integration into the
republican pantheon, consider a few testimonials. They come either
from admirers whom we already respect or from opponents who,
grudgingly or otherwise, respected him. To begin with Cromwell's
contemporaries, surely the best-remembered today is John Milton.
We know Milton mostly as a poet and mostly for his post-
Commonwealth epic, Paradise Lost. But he served the
Commonwealth from the beginning to the end always as a loyal
supporter of the Cromwellian line, even when his sympathies lay to
the left. To Milton fell the hugely important task of legitimating the
regicidal republican regime; to him, also, fell the more mundane job of
Latin Secretary, which involved virtually all diplomatic
correspondence. These commissions, along with his quasi-official
pamphlet campaigning, almost certainly cost him his eyesight. They
also made him a hero of the next century's republican theorists,137 who
in turn were a principal source of inspiration for the American
Revolutionaries. 138
On the leader of his cause, he could wax extremely-by our
standards, embarrassingly- effusive:
Cromwell, our chief of men, who through a cloud / Not of war only,
but detractions rude, / Guided by faith and matchless fortitude / To
peace and truth thy glorious way hast ploughed, / And on the neck
of crowned Fortune proud / Hast reared God's trophies and his
work pursued, / While Darwen stream, with blood of Scots imbrued,
/ And Dunbar field resounds thy praises loud, / And Worchester's
laureate wreath; yet much remains / To conquer still: peace hath her
victories / No less renowned than war; new foes arise / Threat'ning
to bind our souls with secular chains. / Help us to save free
conscience from the paw / Of hireling wolves whose gospel is their
maw.
139
Milton wrote that sonnet in May 1652, near the peak of the
Commonwealth's power and appeal. Doubtlessly Milton's optimism
about Cromwell dimmed a bit with departures from his preferred
republican ideals; perhaps his effusion was tainted a bit by euphoria, if
137. Thus, for example, William Wordsworth took admiration of Milton to be the
touchstone of republican standing:
Great men have been among us; hands that penned
And tongues that uttered wisdom - better none:
The later Sidney, Marvel, Harrington,
Young Vane, and others that called Milton friend.
Fink, supra note 45, at ii (quoting Wordsworth).
138. See Bailyn, supra note 17, at 34 ("Among the seventeenth-century progenitors
of this line of eighteenth-century radical writers and opposition politicians... Milton
was an important figure-not Milton the poet so much as Milton the radical
tractarian .... ).
139. John Milton, Sonnet XVI to the Lord General Cromwell, in The Complete
Poetical Works of John Milton 190, 190-91 (Douglas Bush ed., 1965).
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not adulation. But Milton stood by Cromwell to the end and by the
Good Old Cause beyond the end. 1  On the very eve of the
restoration of the monarchy he published True Commonwealth. Had
he been a flatterer, that would have been the better time for it; as it
was, he spent several very tense months under arrest and very
narrowly escaped execution.
But even if Milton's praise of Cromwell was sincere, it was hardly
non-partisan. For that, consider the opinion of another
contemporary, George Fox, one of the founders of the radical Puritan
sect we call the Quakers. In Cromwell's time the Quakers had not yet
earned their breakfast-cereal safe reputation; they were almost
universally regarded as dangerous radicals. Their refusal to take
oaths, and even more their tendency to disrupt rival religious
meetings, kept them often afoul of the law. Cromwell frequently
intervened for leniency on behalf of members of the sect, including
Fox himself. 141  Fox's autobiography includes accounts of several
amicable meetings with Cromwell; one of the last of those meetings, in
Cromwell's official residence at Hampton Court, ended like this:
Many more words I had with him; but people coming in, I drew a
little back. As I was turning, he caught me by the hand, and with
tears in his eyes said, "Come again to my house; for if thou and I
were but an hour of a day together, we should be nearer one to the
other"; adding that he wished me no more ill than he did to his own
SOUl.
142
Nor were the Quakers the only persecuted sect who benefited from
Cromwell's policy of tolerance. With his consent and under his
personal protection, Jews, banned from England since the Middle
Ages, were permitted not only to return but also to practice their
religion openly and freely.'43 This has earned Cromwell a place in The
Jewish Encyclopedia and honorable mention from Golda Meir's
foreign minister, Abba Eban.' 4
Cromwell's generosity toward Jews may have been the reason he
140. Hill, supra note 131, at 314 ("Milton criticized the avarice and ambition of the
Parliamentary leaders and generals: like Marvell, he never condemned the Good Old
Cause itself, nor indeed Oliver Cromwell."). But cf. Worden, supra note 132, at 241
("Although the evidence for the development and the depth of Milton's personal
hostility to Cromwell is thin, the poet is certainly capable of having come to share the
belief of other republicans that the protector had sacrificed the revolution on the altar
of his own ambition.").
141. See CV. Wedgwood, Oliver Cromwell 94 (rev. ed. 1973) ("After an interview
with George Fox, he allowed the Quaker movement to gather momentum
unmolested."); id. at Ill ("His generous encouragement of the Quakers, in some
ways the most extreme, as they were also the most constructive, of the new sectaries,
was much to his credit.").
142. George Fox, Journal 106 (Ernst Rhys ed., 1924).
143. Abba Eban, Heritage: Civilization and the Jews 207-08 (1984); Wedgwood,
supra note 141, at 111.
144. Eban, supra note 143, at 208.
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was the particular hero of Sigmund Freud. Freud published his
Interpretation of Dreams in 1899 at the end of fin-de-siecle Vienna
with all its general cultural glories and its exceptionally open
multiculturalism, of which Freud himself was both a beneficiary and
an exemplar. But it was also the Vienna that bred Hitler. Anti-
Semitism was unmistakably on the rise, even at the center of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire. Casting about for a haven in history, at
the dawn of the unspeakable horrors of the Holocaust, which drove
him off the continent to England, Freud hit upon Oliver's
Commonwealth: "I am recalling what is for me the most interesting
historical period, the reign of the Puritans and Oliver Cromwell."'45
In homage to his hero, he named his second son Oliver.'46
Theodore Roosevelt, a contemporary of Freud, is currently
undergoing critical re-assessment himself. In 1901 Roosevelt
published a biography of Cromwell.' 47 He was looking back, as Freud
was, at the turn of the last century. But his perspective was perhaps
less like Freud's and more like ours. Like us, he was looking for
guidance forward on the threshold of a new century. He was the
young, idealistic President of a country that stood in the world then as
Milton had seen England stand in Oliver's time: a "puissant nation
rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her
invincible locks.., an eagle mewing her mighty youth, and kindling
her undazzled eyes at the full midday beam .... ,,4
Roosevelt was not bashful about power, or about projecting power
overseas: he dispatched a great naval flotilla on a global tour to show
American strength; he coined the phrase "speak softly and carry a big
stick." But his was no crude gunboat diplomacy, and if he was a bit of
an imperialist adventurer, his ambitions were solidly for the progress
of the values he read from the great Anglo-American revolutionary
tradition. He didn't need to be reminded that with great power comes
great responsibility; he was ready to remind others what America, in
her first century as a world power, would be responsible for. He had
been thrust into the Presidency by the assassination of his
predecessor, an act of terrorism shocking even by the standards of our
own shocked era. He took to heart Oliver Cromwell's paradoxical
motto: "War for peace."
Here is Roosevelt's assessment of the Commonwealth and its
leaders:
The whole history of the movement which resulted in the
establishment of the Commonwealth of England will be misread and
misunderstood if we fail to appreciate that it was the first modern,
145. Maurice Ashley, The Greatness of Oliver Cromwell 369 (1957).
146. Id.
147. Theodore Roosevelt, Oliver Cromwell 6 (1901).
148. John Milton, Areopagitica, in 1 Norton Anthology of English Literature 1349,
1359 (3d ed. 1974).
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and not the last mediaeval, movement; if we fail to understand that
the men who figured in it and the principles for which they
contended, are strictly akin to the men and principles that have
appeared in all similar great movements since: in the English
Revolution of 1688; in the American Revolution of 1776; and the
American Civil War of 1.861 .... Fundamentally, it was the first
struggle for religious, political, and social freedom, as we now
understand the terms.1
49
And he was no less laudatory of Oliver himself:
Sooner or later, justice will be done him; sooner or later, he will be
recognized, not only as one of the greatest of all Englishmen, and by
far the greatest ruler of England itself, but as a man who, in times
that tried men's souls, dealt with vast questions and solved
tremendous problems; a man who erred, who was guilty of many
shortcomings, but who strove mightily toward the light as it was
given him to see the light; a man who had the welfare of his
countrymen and the greatness of his country very close to his heart,
and who sought to make the great laws of righteousness living forces
in the government of the world.15"
Roosevelt, of course, was not a professional historian and, in any
event, his assessment is dated as well as tendentious. Among
professional historians, Cromwell's fortunes sank in the first half of
the twentieth century; comparisons to contemporary dictators were all
too ready at hand. 15 He has fared much better since.152 "But," to put
it mildly, "his career and character remain controversial."' 153  Even
honest admirers cannot fully absolve him of all that he did, or allowed
to be done' 54 -nor, to recall his instructions to his portraitist, would he
himself have wanted to be whitewashed. Still, we may let one of his
admirers-both a noted historian and a self-identified partisan of the
political left' 55-have the last word here:
So long as men and women 'with the root of the matter in them' call
149. Roosevelt, supra note 147, at 6.
150. Id. at 240-41.
151. See Ashley, supra note 145, at 17-18 (noting tendency of biographers of the
1930s to assimilate Cromwell to fascist dictators); Wedgwood, supra note 14.1, at 119
("In 1939 the shadow of the European dictatorships darkened his image and
historians who still clung to the older liberal interpretations of him as a national hero
in the evolution of English liberty were thrown on the defensive.").
152. See Wedgwood, supra note 141, at 120 ("If Cromwell is not quite a national
hero, he is generally recognized as a great figure in our history, the soldier-
statesman who put an end to civil war, restored peace at home and respect abroad.).
153. Id.
154. As to the darkest blot on his career, the atrocities of Commonwealth forces in
Ireland, even his admirer and rehabilitator, Thomas Carlyle could manage no more
than to let him speak for himself. Cf Ashley, supra note 145, at 227-39 (defending
Cromwell's Irish campaign as warranted by the standards of warfare, then and now).
155. See Pocock, supra note 129, at 336 (referring to "the older Marxism of
Christopher Hill," citing his "Puritanism and Revolution" (1958) and Society and
Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England" (1964)).
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in question those values of their society which deny our common
humanity, so long indeed as the great issues of liberty and equality
which Oliver raised remain unresolved, so long will he continue to
fascinate, and the debate over him will continue.
56
2. The History of the Republican Future, or a Republican Political
Platform
We, of course, are looking back a century after the first Roosevelt,
and the century that separates us from him contains horrors that even
one as steeped as he in history and tragedy could hardly have
imagined. He lost a favorite son in the first world war of the twentieth
century; his cousin Franklin led the Western alliance through the
unspeakable holocaust of the second. Chastened by that all too recent
past, let us look forward to not just one republican future, but two: the
first in which the republic fares as well as we can hope; the second, not
so well.
a. The New World Order, or Republicanism Triumphant At Last
In domestic matters, imagine George W. Bush genuinely striving to
build his father's "kinder, gentler America," the junior Bush fulfilling
his own rhetoric of "compassionate conservatism." From the
perspective of the present and recent past, of course, this seems
hopelessly unlikely. We remember all too well ihe father's declension
from decrier of "Voodoo Economics" to cheerleader for supply-side
and trickle-down, nor will we soon forget the son's warm embrace of
the religious right and the economically ultra-privileged (not to
mention the former Senate majority leader's Dixiecratic
indiscretions). But changes as strange have come to pass. At the
dawn of the last century, who could have found the seed of Roosevelt
and Taft's reforms in the rot of the Grant and Hayes administrations?
In international affairs, imagine the younger Bush, who scorned
nation-building in his first campaign, 15 laying the foundation of his
father's "New World Order" by the blueprints of Wilson's "Fourteen
Points" and FDR's "Four Freedoms." The U.N. could become what
156. Christopher Hill, God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English
Revolution 275-76 (1970).
[W]e in England to-day can see our problems in secular terms... because
our ancestors put an end to the use of the Church as an exclusive and
persecuting instrument of political masters, not because we are wiser and
better, but because Cromwell, stabling in cathedrals the horses of the most
disciplined and most democratic cavalry the world had yet seen, won a
victory which for ever stopped men being flogged and branded for having
unorthodox views.
Christopher Hill, The English Revolution, 1640, at 16-17 (1985).
157. David E. Sanger, A Delicate Dance of the Interventionist and the Reluctant
Internationalist, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2000, at A25.
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the League might have been; the Pax Americana may be policed, not
only by NATO and the IMF, but also by the International Committee
of the Red Cross-and Crescent. "Regime changes" in Afghanistan,
North Korea, and Iraq could usher in Marshall Plans for the new
century and the new millennium. In the new plans, as in the old,
magnanimity toward old enemies might spill over into generosity
toward exhausted allies, and even beyond.
The U.N. declaration on children"5 8 could be fulfilled, funded by
President Bush's reversal of his first term tax cut and similar policies
among all the industrialized nations. In a massive redistribution of
wealth from industrialized to developing nations, every child in the
world is guaranteed a nutritious diet, adequate health care, and a
primary and secondary education uninterrupted by the necessity of
adult work, much less work under sweatshop conditions. Beyond that,
every child could be given access to the internet, either at home or
within safe walking distance, and could be taught to read in two
languages: that of his or her homeland and English. Ideally, every
child would learn the history of the Republic, alongside the heritage
of republican movements in his or her own homeland and language.
As a result, every child could choose to be a member of the republic, a
citizen of the world. By the end of the century we have just begun, the
language of Lincoln could be the lingua franca of the planet, and the
Roman Republican vision of liberty and commonwealth under law,
the constitution of humankind. The American Republic, midwife of
that global renaissance, will have become what Milton and the
Commonwealthmen wanted England to be, the Rome of the West.
b. The Good Old Cause, or Republicanism Underground Again
But that is not, of course, the direction in which we are headed. In
domestic affairs, the rich are getting richer and the poor, poorer -
both at an astonishing rate. If current economic trends continue for
but a little while longer, we soon will have descended to disparities of
wealth rivaled by only one era in our history, the Gilded Age. In the
near future as in the not so distant past, at the beginning of the new
century as at the beginning of the old, a mere one percent of the
population may control fully half of the nation's bounty.'59
Internationally, matters already more dire may become truly
desperate. President Bush may lead us into an unnecessary war with
an implacable enemy in a notoriously volatile region. Distracted by
his grudge match with his father's nemesis, we may ignore
developments every bit as ominous as the proliferation of weapons of
158. U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959).
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Rich (2002).
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mass destruction: the devastation of entire continents by infectious
disease; the despoliation of irreplaceable ecosystems by rapacious,
robber-baron capitalism; the displacement of emerging democracies
by religious fundamentalism and tribal barbarism. In a word, things
may well go from bad to worse. Indeed, it is hard not to share the
frustration of the defeated populist Tom Watson at the beginning of
the last century, "the world is plunging Hellward. 16
But, unless worse comes unthinkably to worst, all cannot be lost.
Come what may, we need never forget where we have come from, and
where we mean to get to. Even if our old cities were razed and our
own nation ruined, we could take with us into exile the foundations of
our own new Rome. In an hour darker than any we are likely to
know, Lincoln could pledge himself to preserving the true republican
project, government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
When the first English-speaking Republic had collapsed, after the old
order of kings and lords had been restored, Milton could still find
courage to call for a true Commonwealth. We may well hope that,
however dark the coming days, we will always find ourselves in the
fellowship of those who pay more than lip service to Lincoln's
republican pledge, who press on undiscouraged toward Milton's less
remembered but more desirable paradise.
CONCLUSION
At the invitation of the editors of the Fordham Law Review, I have
argued that the most significant development in law and legal ethics
has been the birth in ancient Rome, and the rebirth in diverse times
and places in the West and beyond, of the republican ideal:
government that both respects individual liberty and promotes the
common good. I very much appreciated receiving the invitation, and I
have thoroughly enjoyed making the argument.
In all candor, however, I rather doubt that the argument I have
made is quite what my hosts had in mind; I somewhat suspect that
their invitation, though millennial in its timing, was more
contemporary in its intended focus. Be that as it may, what I said at
the outset remains just the same. Fordham's institutional perspective
is long enough and broad enough to accommodate my project more
than comfortably; the Jesuit educational tradition, like the classical
tradition of which it is an appropriately proud part, takes everything
human as its proper scope.
In that ecumenical and catholic spirit I have tried to make my case;
in that spirit I now entreat you, too, to join the dialogue that began in
Republican Rome and has run through the English Commonwealth
and our own Revolution right down to us, today. That is the first and
160. C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel 396 (Oxford Univ. Press
1975) (1938).
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essential step toward reviving the Roman Republic and remembering
the Good Old Cause. As we take that step, whether we bid them or
not, Brutus and Cicero, Milton and Cromwell, Lincoln and Wilson, all
will be with us.
